Quick Facts

Q: Why was Judge Brian Rahilly removed from cases?

A: After text messages surfaced that raised concerns about impartiality and professionalism, steps were taken to remove Judge Rahilly from certain cases to protect the integrity of proceedings.

Q: Does removal mean the judge committed misconduct?

A: No. Temporary removal or reassignment is a procedural safeguard, not a finding of wrongdoing.

Q: Is pulling a judge from cases common?

A: No, though it is happening more often in Michigan, it is an extraordinary step, used sparingly when neutrality or the appearance of neutrality is in question.

Q: Does this mean the judge was wrong to criticize prosecutors?

A: No. Judges are not only permitted to scrutinize prosecutorial conduct, they are expected to. The issue is not disagreement, but how boundaries are maintained.

Q: Are judges and prosecutors supposed to work closely together?

A: No. They are intentionally adversarial roles within the justice system, with different obligations, powers, and incentives.

Q: Why does this matter right now?

A: Because Michigan is experiencing a pattern where institutional closeness between judges and prosecutors is being normalized, and accountability mechanisms are straining under that weight.


Just the Facts

Judge Brian Rahilly, Michigan’s 11th Circuit Court, was temporarily removed from certain cases after text messages surfaced raising concerns about judicial tone and the appearance of impartiality. The reassignment followed motions and review under existing judicial procedures and was framed as a protective, procedural step, not a finding of misconduct.

The content of the text messages has not resulted in a formal disciplinary ruling at this stage. Instead, the action taken reflects a standard judicial safeguard: when questions arise that could reasonably call a judge’s neutrality into doubt, courts may reassign cases to protect defendants’ rights, preserve public confidence, and avoid future appellate challenges.

No criminal findings have been made. No final determination regarding ethics violations has been issued. The reassignment addresses appearance and process, not guilt.

What matters next is not speculation about motive or personality, but how the justice system understands the proper relationship between judges and prosecutors and whether institutional boundaries that are meant to preserve fairness have eroded.

And for me, that begs one question: if Rahilly is out for being too “mean” to prosecutors, then why aren’t judges who are “too nice” to the state allowed to stay in?

The Rahali Reassignment Reveals a Deeper Structural Failure in Michigan Courts

Recent coverage involving Brian Rahilly has focused entirely on text messages and reassignment, but that framing misses the deeper issue.

Judges and prosecutors are not supposed to be aligned.
They are not colleagues in pursuit of a shared outcome.
They are not meant to operate as a unified institutional front.

They are adversaries by design.

Prosecutors advocate for the state. Judges act as neutral arbiters. The friction between those roles is not a flaw. It is the mechanism that protects defendants, restrains state power, and preserves legitimacy.

When that friction disappears, the system does not become more efficient; it becomes more dangerous. And far too many defendants have seen that dynamic play out in multiple counties, most notably Allegan and Barry.


Prosecutorial Discretion Is Enormous. Judicial Resistance Is Necessary.

Michigan prosecutors exercise extraordinary discretion. They decide who is charged, what charges are filed, how plea negotiations unfold, and what sentences are recommended. That discretion is largely insulated from meaningful oversight. They are rarely if ever held accountable for misconduct.

Judges are often the only institutional check on that power in real time.

When judges question charging decisions, push back on plea practices, or express frustration with how discretion is exercised, that is not misconduct. That is the judiciary doing its job.

The mistake is treating judicial criticism of prosecutors as evidence of bias rather than evidence of engagement.

The concern in the Rahilly matter is not that prosecutorial power was questioned. It is that private communications surfaced in a way that created appearance problems, forcing the system to intervene to protect pending cases.

That intervention is procedural. It is not a repudiation of judicial independence.


We’ve Seen This Movie Before

This is not Michigan’s first confrontation with judicial conduct that blurred ethical and institutional boundaries. And that history makes the current response impossible to view in isolation.

In Michigan, oversight only seems to activate when Prosecutorial Power is threatened, but remains dormant when the same power is being improperly bolstered by a judge.

Case Study: Allegan County

In a prior, well-documented episode involving Margaret Zuzich Bakker, the judge was found to have endorsed disparaging comments made about then-prosecutorial candidate Mike Villar while he was seeking office. At the same time, FOIA disclosures revealed way-too-close working and communicative relationships between Judge Bakker and now Former Allegan County Prosecutor Myrene Koch, relationships that raised serious questions about neutrality and institutional alignment.

Those facts were not speculative. Both Bakker and Koch were cited for misconduct in the Michigan Judicial Benchbook for Disqualification and anonymously in the 2024 Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission Annual Report, which acknowledged improper conduct connected to those interactions.

And yet, despite the findings, Judge Bakker remains on the bench. There was no meaningful removal from cases. Instead, she outright refused to recuse herself. No structural intervention. No visible consequence proportional to the conduct that had been formally identified.

Case Study: Barry County

Not convinced? Consider Judge Michael Schipper, Barry County, who had a prosecutor helping him bench OVs to fit in real-time during sentencing hearings. Schipper honored every single prosecutorial ask in a data set examining upward departures. He has now had two cases remanded by the Michigan Supreme Court for outrageous sentencing practices. This isn’t opinion. This is data.

History Matters

Because when judges engage in conduct that disadvantages defendants or aligns closely with prosecutorial interests and the response is restraint, but when judicial communications critical of prosecutorial power trigger swift reassignment, the question becomes unavoidable: why is enforcement asymmetric?

Oversight that activates selectively is not neutral oversight.
Accountability that flows primarily in one direction is not balanced accountability.

If Michigan is serious about judicial integrity, the standard cannot depend on who is inconvenienced. A system that tolerates judges disparaging prosecutorial candidates or maintaining undisclosed closeness with prosecutors, while reacting forcefully when judicial independence creates discomfort for the prosecution, is not enforcing ethics evenly. It is protecting power.

That is why the current episode is not just about tone, text messages, or reassignment. It is about whether Michigan’s judicial accountability mechanisms are applied consistently, or whether they continue to operate in ways that favor prosecutorial interests over structural fairness.

Until that question is confronted directly, these moments will keep repeating. And public confidence will continue to erode.


Michigan Has Normalized the Wrong Relationships

This episode cannot be understood in isolation. Michigan courts have increasingly normalized institutional closeness between judges and prosecutors that would be unthinkable in a healthier system.

Judges and prosecutors:

  • Share buildings
  • Share informal access
  • Share professional familiarity
  • Share unspoken assumptions about alignment

When that closeness is disrupted, resistance follows.

We are seeing that now, not only in judicial reassignment cases, but in public opposition from prosecutors who bristle at physical separation from courthouses, treating it as an affront rather than a safeguard. The discomfort is telling.

If judges and prosecutors were truly operating as independent actors, separation would not feel threatening. It would feel ordinary. Normal, even.

There is not a single defendant that would be upset about a prosecutor being called an idiot. If anything, it might just mean that for once, you actually have a fair shot at a trial.


Reassignment Is a Containment Measure, Not a Condemnation

Pulling a judge from cases when questions arise is not punishment. It is containment.

It protects:

  • Defendants from later claims of tainted proceedings
  • Victims from retrials caused by avoidable credibility issues
  • Courts from institutional damage

But it should not be misread as an admission that judicial pushback against prosecutors is improper. If anything, the opposite is true.

A system where judges never irritate prosecutors is a system where prosecutorial power has gone largely unchecked for far too long.


Selective Due Process, Plainly Stated

The contrast here is striking.

While Brian Rahilly is being treated as a radioactive asset because private communications revealed an adversarial posture toward prosecutorial power, Jeff Getting is publicly complaining that moving his office away from the courthouse will harm “efficiency,” as though the Sixth Amendment were an inconvenience to his morning commute.

What Getting is really arguing is not about efficiency at all. He is arguing that for the system to function smoothly, the prosecutor must remain physically tethered to the court. That argument reveals how deeply institutional closeness has been normalized. When prosecutors expect proximity to judges as a baseline condition of “working well,” something has already gone very wrong.

Judges and prosecutors are not meant to be colleagues. They are not meant to be aligned. And they are certainly not meant to be sharing coffee in the same break room every morning. Physical and professional separation is not hostility. It is a safeguard.

The selective nature of enforcement makes this impossible to ignore. Prosecutors like Getting, or Alger County Prosecutor Robert Steinhoff (who is running for 11th Circuit Judge, by the way), who filed the writ against Rahilly, invoke the language of integrity and neutrality when it serves prosecutorial interests. But when judges such as Margaret Zuzich Bakker or Judge Michael Schipper were documented time and again to be uncomfortably close to prosecutors, those same voices were notably quiet about the “integrity of the system.”

That inconsistency is the problem.

A system that reacts aggressively when judges privately criticize prosecutorial power, while tolerating or minimizing conduct that reflects prosecutorial closeness to the bench, is not enforcing due process evenly. It is enforcing it selectively, in ways that favor the prosecution.

Due process cannot hinge on who is inconvenienced. If institutional proximity is treated as harmless when it benefits prosecutors, but adversarial independence is treated as dangerous when it challenges them, the imbalance is no longer subtle. It is structural.


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A Letter to Prosecutor Robert Steinhoff

I have requested comment from Prosecutor Steinhoff regarding his writ against Judge Rahilly, and am waiting response:

Dear Mr. Steinhoff,

I am writing to request your response to several questions related to your recent actions concerning judicial oversight, particularly in light of your current campaign for a judgeship.

As Alger County Prosecutor, you sought extraordinary relief against Judge Brian Rahilly following the surfacing of private text messages characterized as adversarial toward prosecutorial practices. At the same time, you are actively seeking election to the bench, presenting yourself as a candidate committed to fairness, integrity, and public trust in the courts.

Given that context, I am seeking clarification on the following:

  1. How do you reconcile seeking extraordinary measures against a sitting judge for perceived adversarial posture while simultaneously campaigning to assume judicial authority yourself?
  2. Do you believe it is appropriate for a prosecutor with an active judicial campaign to play a central role in efforts that sideline a sitting judge, particularly where no final finding of misconduct has been issued?
  3. In your view, should judicial accountability mechanisms apply evenly regardless of whether judicial conduct favors or inconveniences the prosecution?
  4. How do you respond to concerns that judicial independence is being chilled when judges who question prosecutorial discretion are treated as institutional risks, while judges shown to have close working relationships with prosecutors have historically faced little or no consequence?
  5. More broadly, do you believe judges and prosecutors should maintain clear institutional and physical separation to preserve adversarial balance and public confidence, or do you view close working proximity as necessary for “efficiency”?

These questions arise in the context of ongoing reporting examining selective enforcement in Michigan’s judicial accountability systems, including documented instances where judges aligned with prosecutorial interests were cited for misconduct yet allowed to remain on the bench without structural intervention.

I am happy to include your responses in full and in context.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,
Rita Williams
Editor
Clutch Justice


Another vital question, is whether Steinhoff used Alger County prosecutor’s office resources to send out press releases about his campaign. But I’ll save that for another day.


Why This Case Matters

This is not about one judge’s messages. It is about a system that has drifted away from its own architecture.

Judges and prosecutors are supposed to be separate.
They are supposed to clash.
They are supposed to test each other’s assumptions and limits.

When the justice system begins to confuse adversarial tension with dysfunction, it loses the very safeguards that keep it legitimate.

Michigan is now confronting the consequences of blurred boundaries that should never have been blurred in the first place.


The Verdict

Judicial accountability matters.
But so does prosecutorial accountability.

And neither can exist when proximity replaces independence and familiarity replaces restraint.

Reassigning a judge in response to appearance concerns is appropriate. Treating judicial resistance to prosecutorial power as the problem is not.

The real issue is structural. And Michigan can no longer afford to ignore it.