In November 2026, Michigan voters will again face a quiet but consequential ballot question: whether to convene a constitutional convention to review and potentially revise the state constitution.
Also referred to as a “Con-Con”, this opportunity appears automatically every sixteen years under the Michigan Constitution. It does not propose specific changes. It does not amend the law. It asks only whether the public wants to reopen the foundational document that governs Michigan’s institutions, including its courts.
That alone makes it worth serious attention.
Michigan’s judicial system is shaped less by statutes than by constitutional architecture. Court structure, judicial selection, oversight mechanisms, and rule-making authority are all rooted in constitutional design choices made decades ago. Many of today’s most persistent court problems trace back to those design decisions.
A constitutional convention is not a fix. It is a mechanism. Whether it becomes a tool for improvement or simply a forum for debate depends on how it is understood and used.
What the 2026 Vote Actually Does
The 2026 ballot question asks whether a convention should be held to revise the Michigan Constitution.
If voters approve the question:
- Delegates are elected statewide
- The convention meets to propose constitutional changes
- Any proposed changes return to voters for final approval
If voters reject the question:
- The constitution remains unchanged
- The question reappears in 2042
A convention does not suspend courts, override existing law, or enact changes on its own. It does however, create a structured, public process for re-examining how state government is organized.
And that distinction matters deeply, especially when it comes to discussions about the judiciary.
Why Courts Are a Central Constitutional Issue
Michigan’s courts derive their authority from Article VI of the state constitution. This article governs:
- Judicial selection and term length
- Court structure and jurisdiction
- Rule-making authority
- Judicial discipline and oversight
- Administrative control of the court system
Many contemporary concerns about Michigan courts are not primarily about individual actors. They are about design. When court systems struggle with accountability, transparency, or consistency, the cause is often structural rather than personal.
A constitutional review is one of the only tools capable of addressing those structural questions directly.
Structural Problems Rooted in Constitutional Design
Judicial Accountability
Michigan judges operate with significant independence, but oversight mechanisms are limited and often opaque. Disciplinary systems exist, yet public confidence remains low when complaints rarely result in visible outcomes.
The constitution defines the boundaries of judicial accountability. Revisiting those boundaries is a constitutional question, not a statutory one.
Court Rule Authority
Michigan’s highest court exercises broad authority over procedural rules that shape everyday court operations. This concentration of power raises recurring concerns about separation of powers and public input.
A convention could examine whether the current balance still serves fairness, access, and public trust.
Judicial Selection and Elections
Michigan uses a hybrid judicial election system that blends partisan nomination with nonpartisan ballots. This structure creates confusion for voters and inconsistent accountability for judges.
Other states use appointment, merit selection, or retention systems. Each model has tradeoffs. The key point is that Michigan’s model is a constitutional choice, not an inevitability.
Administrative Centralization
Court administration is centralized under statewide control. While this promotes uniformity, it can also reduce responsiveness to local conditions and limit external review.
A constitutional review allows these tradeoffs to be examined openly rather than treated as fixed.
How a Convention Could Improve Courts Without Politicizing Them
A constitutional convention does not require courts to become political. It allows the public to reassess governance choices using evidence and experience.
Potential areas for improvement include:
- Clearer standards for judicial discipline and transparency
- Defined safeguards for cognitive and mental fitness
- Improved public access to records and proceedings
- Structural protections against conflicts of interest
- Streamlined limits on administrative authority
None of these proposals dictate outcomes, but they do create frameworks that courts then operate within.
Strong institutions depend entirely on strong design.
Common Fears and Misconceptions
Opposition to change will likely have a lot to stay about the Con-Con and why we shouldn’t have one. Let’s play a little game of “Mythbusters” shall we?
“A Convention Would Be Chaotic”
Conventions are structured processes with elected delegates, formal procedures, and voter ratification. Michigan has held successful conventions before, most recently in the early 1960s.
Chaos is not inherent. Design and participation matter.
“Courts Would Be Undermined”
Judicial independence is not the same as insulation from accountability. A convention can strengthen independence by clarifying roles, expectations, and limits.
“Nothing Would Change”
Even if no amendments pass, a convention forces public examination of institutional design. That scrutiny alone can reshape future reforms and legislative priorities.
If Voters Approve a Constitutional Convention…
If Michigan voters choose to convene a Constitutional Convention, I plan to run as a delegate.
Not as a career politician, and not as a culture-war candidate, but as someone who has spent years studying how constitutional language is actually applied (or ignored entirely) inside Michigan’s courts, agencies, and most importantly, sentencing systems. Far too often for my liking, constitutional guarantees fail not because they are absent, but because they are structurally easy to ignore.
I believe this is far too important to stand on the sidelines, and I feel compelled to put in the work for court reform.
My focus as a delegate would be narrow and practical: reinforcing constitutional protections that govern due process, sentencing integrity, and checks on discretionary power. That includes examining how constitutional rights are implemented at the trial level, how appellate safeguards function in practice, and where ambiguity allows systemic abuse to persist.
A Constitutional Convention should not be about ideology. It should be about repairing weak points in governance that real people encounter when the system is under stress.
If voters decide to take that step, I intend to be part of that work.
Why This Matters
Michiganders who have been beaten bloody by the system, this is your chance. This is the path we need to take to fix what’s broken.
Courts shape liberty, safety, family integrity, and economic stability. When court systems lose public trust, the damage extends far beyond individual cases.
Michigan’s constitutional convention question is not about ideology. It is about whether the public believes its foundational institutions should be periodically re-examined in light of lived experience.
The judiciary does not exist outside the constitution; it exists because of it.
Revisiting constitutional design is not an attack on courts. It is an acknowledgment that systems, like people, require reflection and recalibration to remain legitimate.
