Joey Nagle Was Murdered June 16, 2022. Four Years Later, We May Finally Know Who Did It.

The deputy’s wrong LEIN query, undocumented verification steps, and a fatal encounter the released record still does not fully reconstruct.

By Rita Williams

After reviewing the released investigative file, I do not consider the deputy’s written statement a sufficiently corroborated reconstruction of Joseph Nagle’s final moments. The deputy’s first documented database action was wrong. Material portions of his account still require movements and body positions the released record does not explain.

That is my assessment of the account’s reliability. It does not establish that every statement was false. MSP expressly records the wrong plate query and separately asked the deputy how the confrontation moved from Joey’s Impala to the front or front side of the patrol SUV. The substantive answer to that movement question was not located in the released materials reviewed. [1, pp. 38, 44]

The investigation subjected Joey’s life to extraordinary scrutiny after his death. The deputy’s conduct, documented mistakes, procedural decisions, evidence handling, and account deserve the same scrutiny. The released record documents one LEIN plate query: EJV6675, not Joey’s EJV6635. It records the correct plate spoken over the radio, but no LEIN query of that plate and no LEIN driver-license query for Joey. [1, pp. 11–20, 33–38, 48]

Start by assuming the deputy is telling the truth. Can we reconstruct his version from the photographs, radio timestamps, autopsy, and documented evidence locations without supplying important facts ourselves? No, we absolutely cannot. The released record does not tell us enough about the movement between vehicles, the timing of particular actions, or the participants’ positions at the shot. A physically possible hypothetical is not a verified reconstruction.

Joseph Maverick Nagle was 22 when an Allegan County sheriff’s deputy shot him during a June 16, 2022 traffic stop on 26th Street in Monterey Township. The autopsy records one penetrating gunshot wound of the chest. The deputy’s June 21 letter acknowledges firing once. Koch declined charges. [3] [4] [24]

Scope: the 51-page MSP report, 93-page external-document packet, separate four-page deputy letter, autopsy, toxicology report, available scene images and inventories listing 145 photographs, and the prosecutor’s memorandum identified below. Page references are PDF page numbers. The raw LEIN drive, underlying recordings, complete phone extraction, unredacted file, and complete ACSO policies were not available for this edit. Family accounts remain separately attributed. Visible markers identify claims still requiring supporting material.

Report audit: inaccuracies, unsupported claims, and unresolved problems

Nineteen items came out of comparing the report against its own supporting packet. Each one below distinguishes an actual mismatch from missing corroboration, a procedural question, or an inference the evidence cannot establish; none of it labels every investigative gap a false statement. Tap any line for the evidence behind it, then keep reading, the sections that follow take the material findings further.

Running the stop against Michigan’s own training standard

Michigan’s basic-training curriculum, ACSO’s written policy, and constitutional or statutory law are three different sources of standards. MCOLES describes training objectives. ACSO’s specific written traffic-stop and verification policies have not been supplied for comparison. A training objective is not, by itself, an ACSO General Order or a constitutional requirement. Those distinctions do not diminish the documented error: the deputy ran the wrong plate. [1, p. 38]

MCOLES Module V-B-1, Vehicle and Driver Licensing, supplies the specific license-check objective. Under V.B.1.1, officers request a LEIN check of current license status: suspension or revocation, restrictions, wants and warrants, and repeat-offender status. Under V.B.1.3, registration information is verified through Secretary of State computer records, or INLETS through LEIN for out-of-state vehicles. [23, pp. 1–2]

The companion Module V-B-4, Stopping Vehicles and Occupant Control, addresses traffic-stop procedure. V.B.4.1 includes notifying dispatch of the stop location, reason, and vehicle license number. V.B.4.3 separately addresses determining the driver’s license and insurance status during the interview. [22, pp. 1, 3]

V-B-1’s history records a September 2021 review, before Joey’s June 16, 2022 stop, and a later November 2023 review. This establishes the module’s pre-stop history, but does not prove every word of this later copy was unchanged in June 2022 or when this deputy personally received the material. V-B-4 lists the same review dates. [23, p. 2] [22, p. 3]

The first four minutes deserve close scrutiny. Three minutes and 49 seconds elapsed between the stop call at 22:04:07 and the deputy’s report that testing was underway at 22:07:56. By that report, the only plate database query documented in the released material was the wrong one. No correct-plate LEIN query or driver-license LEIN query is documented. [1, pp. 37–38]

The timing alone does not establish that the deputy lacked a factual basis to investigate impairment. In his letter, he reported unusual stopping, travel below the speed limit, crossing the center and fog lines, marijuana odor, and agitation after Joey exited the car. He reported that Joey denied drug use. These are the deputy’s claimed observations and quoted responses, not independently verified findings about impairment. [3, pp. 1–2]

The deputy’s first documented database action was wrong. At 22:03:10 he queried EJV6675, not Joey’s plate, EJV6635. Fifty-seven seconds later he verbally gave dispatch the correct plate, but the released investigative record does not show that he ever ran EJV6635 through LEIN. Nor does it show a LEIN query of Joey’s driver’s license. Those are not minor bookkeeping questions in a traffic stop that escalated into a fatal shooting. The investigation scrutinized Joey’s conduct extensively. The deputy’s own mistakes deserve the same scrutiny. [1, pp. 37–38]

The deputy’s letter says Joey immediately handed him his license and that he later read its address. Possessing, reading, or visually inspecting the license does not establish database verification. The released Nagle record does not document a LEIN driver-license query. MSP’s narrative identifies the LEIN log as property item 28; this review has the released summary, not the underlying drive’s complete transaction data. [3, pp. 1–2] [1, p. 38]

Visual inspection of documents and database verification are distinct steps. The absence of a narrated paper-document check does not establish that it was omitted; registration verification also has a computer-record component in V-B-1. The comparison below identifies what the released record documents, without treating silence as proof of nonperformance. [23]

Other acts are documented: the stop and later status calls, the backup request, CPR, clearance for Fire/EMS to approach, and responders securing the scene. The deputy’s letter places the backup request before his arrest approach; the radio interval alone does not time the onset of physical contact. Those documented acts do not correct the wrong plate query or supply the missing verification transactions. [1, pp. 37–38] [3, p. 3]

This comparison identifies an error and the verification steps absent from the released record. It does not assign a legal verdict to the shooting. The training objectives make the omissions worth investigating; the record supplies the wrong query as a fact. Departmental compliance requires the applicable written policies.

The movement MSP had to ask about

The stop is one problem. What happened after it is another, and it turns on a question Michigan State Police itself could not answer from the deputy’s own account. The deputy’s letter describes an encounter that moves repeatedly: first to the front of the Impala, then to the patrol SUV, back to the Impala for glasses, and back to the patrol SUV for attempted eye testing. Later, he describes Joey moving toward his driver’s door, placing his hands on his head, coming down onto the Impala’s hood, and standing and moving toward the middle of his car. A heavily redacted account of the struggle follows. [3, pp. 2–3]

Criger’s follow-up is specific. He asked whether the deputy knew or remembered how they got from the front of Nagle’s vehicle to the front or front side of the deputy’s vehicle. On July 7, Criger received an answer through attorney Mike Woronko. He recorded that it was unsigned because it came through an email exchange, but would serve as the deputy’s official answer. [1, p. 44]

The question demonstrates a gap in the original account. It does not establish that MSP found the movement physically impossible. Nor does this release establish that the answer was withheld from the prosecutor: Criger said it would be included in external documents, and later wrote that the report and all external documents would be forwarded for review on August 11. I could not locate the substantive July 7 answer in the supplied packet. [1, pp. 44, 49]

The evidence is spread between two vehicles

Absent that answer, the physical evidence is the closest thing to one. The photographs show keys on the Impala’s driver’s seat. The reports place Joey’s glasses and driver’s license on the roadway near that car, and the deputy’s flashlight in the grassy shoulder between the vehicles. The casing was documented near the patrol SUV; the lab describes its collection location as southwest of that vehicle. Joey’s final documented position was in the grass near the SUV’s passenger-side front wheel. [1, pp. 4–5] [2, pp. 8–9, 80–81] [7]

That distribution calls for an explanation of movement, recovery, and scene changes. A final position documented after lifesaving efforts is not automatically the precise position at the instant of the shot. The casing also cannot, by itself, fix the shooter’s location.

Research on cartridge-case ejection shows why a blanket “within a few feet” rule is insufficient: firearm and ammunition characteristics, magazine condition, human factors, and the environment affect where cases land. A useful reconstruction would test the recovered location against the actual firearm and relevant conditions, including possible deflection or later movement. [8] [9]

There was firearm examination here. The laboratory identified scene item L1 as fired by the submitted Glock 22 Gen4 .40-caliber pistol. The recovered projectile comparison was inconclusive: it shared class characteristics but lacked sufficient reproducible individual characteristics for identification. That is neither a positive projectile match nor an exclusion. These tests address the firearm; they do not explain the participants’ positions. [2, pp. 83–84]

The hood check and the downward wound path

Two more pieces of physical evidence deserve the same treatment: the hood he says Joey went down on, and the wound itself. After reviewing the deputy’s statement, Criger returned to examine the Impala. He documented no damage or dents to the hood. He did find dents on the rear driver’s door and rear quarter panel, but could not determine when or how they occurred. The precise passage that prompted his inspection is redacted. [1, p. 7]

The inspection did not produce hood-damage corroboration. That matters, but it does not prove that contact with the hood never occurred or that such contact necessarily would have left a dent.

Koch’s memorandum recounts the deputy’s claim that repeated punches and headbutts preceded blurred vision and weakening legs. That remains his account because the autopsy findings do not support it.[24] His letter says he was starting to drop, released Joey’s wrist, drew his firearm, and fired once. [3, p. 3]

The autopsy documents the wound, not a second eyewitness account. The entrance is slightly right of the center of the chest. Its eccentric marginal abrasion extends from the 9:00 to 12:00 positions; stippling extends from the 9:00 to 6:00 positions, up to 2.4 centimeters from the wound. There is no muzzle imprint or gunpowder soot. The internal path is front to back, slightly right to left, and downward with the body in standard anatomical position. [4, pp. 3–4]

Those findings must be accounted for in a reconstruction. They do not, on their own, place the deputy at Joey’s “upper right,” determine a roadway firing angle, or establish the men’s posture. The autopsy’s anatomical directions describe the path through Joey’s body; the wound-clock positions do not supply a separate, verified map of the shooter’s location. No case-specific reconstruction resolving those relationships was located in the reviewed material.

Koch attributes a six-to-eighteen-inch muzzle-distance estimate to a September 2022 discussion with Dr. Brooks and treats it as supporting proximity. That estimate supports close range; it does not, by itself, establish relative posture or orientation. [24]

The released record still needs to connect the claimed movement, Joey’s torso orientation, and the muzzle position at the shot. A downward anatomical path does not by itself disprove a falling shooter. Nor does proximity independently corroborate the complete physical account. No known-distance test-firing procedure was located in the released materials reviewed. The firearms report does document two test shots using submitted ammunition for comparison. Those comparison shots are not documented as a muzzle-distance reconstruction. [3, p. 3] [4, pp. 3–4] [2, pp. 83–84]

The unused Taser deserves direct scrutiny. The deputy had a less-lethal weapon, serial X2900EM21; MSP’s downloaded history indicated it was not used during this incident. [1, pp. 8, 44–45] [2, pp. 63–75] Koch concluded it was not a viable option during the close struggle. That is her assessment, not a case-specific technical finding established here. [24] The investigative question includes earlier opportunities: was there a reasonable chance to use less-lethal force, disengage, create distance, or wait for backup before the encounter reached the deadly-force threshold the deputy described? The release does not resolve that question. The presence of a Taser alone does not establish an obligation to deploy it first or prove that it would have prevented the shooting.

The timing of evidence collection was materially different. MSP’s property entries record the deputy’s uniform shirt and Taser as seized from D/Sgt. Arnsman on June 22, six days after the shooting. The Taser history was downloaded July 7, three weeks after the shooting. Criger records receiving medical records through counsel on August 4. Evidence from Joey—including blood, fingernail clippings, a DNA card, and clothing—was collected through the June 17 autopsy and immediate death investigation. Most related property entries carry June 17; the shirt entry carries June 18. That disparity deserves explanation. [1, pp. 8, 22–26, 44–45, 48] [4, p. 7]

The record also identifies immediate collection involving the deputy: his firearm, ammunition, and radio earpiece connector were seized June 16, and his injuries and uniform were photographed. Casperson separately records drying and securing Joey’s clothing before repackaging it June 22. These details matter when comparing treatment of the evidence. The later seizure and receipt dates do not, by themselves, establish a custody break. [1, pp. 2–4, 22]

The windows were down, and the search was limited

The vehicle itself raises a parallel custody question. This detail is explicit in MSP’s laboratory report: the Impala’s front driver and passenger windows were rolled down; its rear windows were up. The patrol SUV’s four doors were closed and its windows were up, although its rear hatch was open. These are documented scene conditions, not proof that every window remained in that position throughout the stop or subsequent response. [2, p. 80]

“Since a search warrant was not obtained, the CSRT did not search the silver Impala.” [2, p. 80]

Criger separately records an inventory search with D/Sgt. Todd Petersen before towing. That search produced the knife, suspected marijuana cigarettes, and the phone. An inventory of valuables and a forensic interior examination answer different questions. The released records document the former and explicitly describe the scene team’s decision not to perform its own search. [1, pp. 5–6]

A properly conducted inventory of a lawfully impounded vehicle may fall within a warrant exception when standardized procedures serve legitimate administrative purposes. South Dakota v. Opperman and Colorado v. Bertine do not establish that this particular search complied with ACSO policy. [25] [26] Workman later found Joey’s wallet in the center console on July 28. That raises a legitimate question about the thoroughness of the claimed inventory and whether it complied with ACSO’s standardized procedure. That procedure has not been supplied for comparison. [1, pp. 5–6, 46, 48]

Open windows make access to the interior a legitimate scene-integrity question. They do not establish that someone introduced an object. The useful questions are who accessed the vehicle, when the interior was first photographed, and whether those photographs precede or follow each search or handling event.

A Milwaukee knife is not an ownership finding

One of the things that search turned up deserves scrutiny on its own. Criger reports finding a red folding knife, blade out, between the front passenger seat and passenger door. The close-up photograph identifies it as Milwaukee-branded. It was recorded inside the Impala, not recovered from Joey’s person or beside his body. Holscher, the early responder who took over compressions, told investigators he did not recall seeing weapons on Joey or on the ground nearby, while emphasizing that he was focused on lifesaving. [1, pp. 5, 10] [7, IMG_0201–0202]

Joey’s mother did not recognize this as a type of knife he carried. I found no disclosed latent-print or DNA examination of the knife, or a documented determination of its ownership, in the supplied records. Its discovery in the car does not establish that Joey possessed it during the confrontation or used it to threaten anyone and it never came up in the Deputy’s statement.

The wide scene photograph also shows a Milwaukee-branded work light and a survey target on a pole. These are consistent with the documented scene-processing activity: Sgt. Ryan Dangl reports using the Wayland Post’s Leica total station and data collector to take 32 measurements. The report names the crime-scene personnel as Grace Bommarito, Rebecca Crum, and Russ Karsten. [2, pp. 8–9, 79] [7, 20220617021820]

The shared brand does not establish ownership or connect the knife to a responder. The reviewed release supplies no forensic result or ownership determination connecting it to the confrontation. The questions are concrete: when was the knife first documented, who accessed the interior before then, and what print, DNA, or ownership work was performed? The photographs alone do not answer them and MSP did none of the footwork.

What the clock does and does not show

Return to the clock, this time with MSP’s dispatch summary rather than a single line in a table. MSP’s radio summary records the stop at 10:04:07 p.m.; testing status at 10:07:56; “still testing” at 10:11:19; a backup request at 10:13:19; “fighting with one” at 10:13:46; and “shot fired” at 10:14:41. That is 10 minutes 34 seconds from the stop call to the shots-fired report, 82 seconds from backup request to shots-fired report, and 55 seconds from fight report to shots-fired report. These are radio intervals, not direct measurements of the start of physical contact or the instant of firing. [1, pp. 37–38]

The letter describes aborted and restarted HGN attempts. A model that automatically adds 90–120 seconds for a completed HGN test misrepresents that account. Nor can the entire stop, glasses retrieval, and testing sequence be squeezed into the final 55 or 82 seconds: those activities are described earlier.

There is a separate, concrete testing question. The letter says Joey retrieved and put on his glasses before the eye test, without describing their removal. NHTSA’s 2018 refresher instructions tell officers to have subjects remove eyeglasses. The difference warrants clarification about how the test was administered; it does not establish the shooting’s circumstances. [3, p. 2] [10, Session 3, p. 20]

The point of testing the timing is to make assumptions visible. At assumed speech rates of 80–240 words per minute, the 18-word quoted exchange after the fight call would take about 4.5–13.5 seconds without pauses. That leaves a variable amount of a 55-second radio interval for everything else. It does not establish a minimum duration for the partially redacted struggle, or show that the account is mechanically impossible.

Who the records identify as not having shot Joey

The same clock that raises those questions also fixes who was where, and when, which makes it possible to say clearly who this file rules out. Names appear throughout a fatal-shooting file because people respond, provide medical aid, document evidence, or investigate. Their presence in the paperwork is not evidence that they fired the shot. The following exclusions are based on the reported response chronology, not an independent forensic examination of every person’s firearm.

This is a record-supported exclusion list, not a method for guessing a redacted name. The involved deputy remains unnamed in these released documents. Unit A6 and the patrol vehicle’s plate are not, by themselves, a reliable basis for identifying him.

ACSO transparency earns an F under the disclosure criterion stated above. The deputy is unnamed in the released materials, preventing a reliable officer-specific review of his background and disciplinary history. The public should not have to identify the person who used fatal force by eliminating names from an agency assignment page. That is an accountability failure in the release, not proof that MSP performed no investigation of him. The file documents firearm collection, injury photographs, medical records, Taser data, and a request for clarification. The issue is whether that work adequately tested his account and whether the public has been given the information needed to examine it. [1, pp. 2–4, 8, 44–45, 48]

The deputy’s letter identifies his assignment as the Leighton/Dorr contract. Clutch was able to locate a June 10, 2022 Wayback Machine snapshot of Allegan County’s contracted-patrols page as naming Bernard Austhof and Matt Langlois. [21] Austhof’s post-shot response is documented independently. If the retained snapshot lists only those two deputies, that makes the other listed deputy a concrete identification lead. A public assignment page still does not establish who actually worked the shift or account for substitutions. That is why the duty assignment matters. Duty rosters and administrative-leave records are the relevant next sources. Clutch has pending requests for those records and the deputy’s disciplinary and promotion history[3, p. 1] [1, p. 38]

The phone, the floor mat, and the identification question

Identity cuts the other way too, toward what the deputy actually knew about Joey, and toward what happened to Joey’s belongings afterward. The phone was not merely mentioned in passing. Petersen seized it from the dashboard as property item 23. Criger delivered it to Computer Crimes on July 7. The July 19 examination report says the iPhone arrived damaged, that a full file-system extraction was obtained, and that two notes and two videos were tagged for the investigator’s review. Criger later acknowledged that he did not personally examine every part of the large extraction. [1, pp. 6, 44, 48] [2, pp. 37–39]

It is worth emphasizing that the phone was found after the incident in damaged condition, on the dash. But the Deputy’s statement claimed Joey had been driving with the phone in his lap.

MSP also documented Joey’s mother’s request for the phone’s return on July 26. The family states that it has not been returned. We still don’t know what’s on Joey’s phone. I found no receipt documenting its return to the family in the supplied packet. The 2022 documents establish seizure, extraction, and a return request; they do not independently establish the phone’s present custodian or the current reason for retention. [1, p. 48]

The family account in the supplied draft also reports a floor mat missing when the vehicle was returned. In my review, I did not locate a floor-mat property entry or a before-and-after custody record resolving that concern. Separately, the report documents a family request for Joey’s wallet and varsity jacket, a later search that found the wallet, and failure to locate the jacket. [1, pp. 46, 48, 51]

The wrong-plate query and the absence of documented driver-license verification do not establish that the deputy lacked Joey’s identity. The deputy’s letter says Joey handed over his license and that he later read its address. Responders report identifying Joey from the license recovered in the roadway. Those identification acts do not establish a LEIN query. The database findings remain: EJV6675 was queried; EJV6635 and Joey’s driver’s license have no documented LEIN query in the released material. [1, p. 38] [3, pp. 1–2] [2, p. 6]

The supplied draft attributes the remark “That’s him then” to the family’s recollection. Establishing what that remark meant requires the speaker, context, and any recording; the phrase alone does not resolve what the deputy knew before firing.

Scrutiny of Joey and scrutiny of the investigation

The file examines Joey’s prior behavior, workplace allegations, alleged drug use, social-media activity, and selected phone contents. If investigators were willing to examine Joey’s life at that level, the deputy’s own verifiable errors and procedural decisions should not receive less scrutiny. The wrong query, undocumented verification, unused Taser, collection dates, observed injuries, and unresolved scene reconstruction deserve direct examination. That is a comparison of documented investigative work, not a finding about investigators’ motives. [1, pp. 8, 11–20, 28, 33–38, 44–48]

Joey’s toxicology is disclosed in detail. The deputy’s is not. No deputy drug or alcohol toxicology result was located in the released materials reviewed. Medical treatment and injury records do not substitute for that testing. The hospital record says, “Phlebotomy contacted for legal draw per patient supervisor,” and the next page records phlebotomy at bedside. Those entries require follow-up: what was collected, what analysis was requested or performed, who received it, and where are any results? The visible laboratory entries concern HIV and hepatitis exposure testing, not a drug or alcohol screen. The record does not justify treating those entries as proof of either a completed toxicology test or a decision never to test. [2, pp. 48–54] [5, pp. 1–3]

The toxicology distinction is exact. NMS confirmed delta-9 THC and its inactive carboxy metabolite in iliac blood. Cocaine/metabolites appeared in an unconfirmed presumptive urine screen, for which the laboratory recommended a more definitive confirmation technique. Blood cocaine/metabolite confirmation was performed. No confirmed positive cocaine finding was reported in blood. That is not a quoted laboratory finding that the blood test was “negative,” nor does it prove there had never been cocaine use. The presumptive urine finding is not a confirmed measure of cocaine intoxication during the stop. [5, pp. 1–3]

FOX17’s subheadline stated that Joey “was on cocaine when shot.” Its text reported positive toxicology without distinguishing the presumptive urine result from confirmed blood findings. That presentation overstates what the laboratory report establishes. It omits the confirmation limitation and implies certainty about the time of the shooting that the reported result does not supply. [19] [5, pp. 1–3]

There are limits to broad claims about neglected evidence. Fingerprints and palmprints were collected at autopsy. Scene coordinates and photographs were obtained. The firearm was tested. The deputy’s injuries were photographed and described, and the external-document packet contains redacted medical records. The narrower question is whether the relevant items were tested and the results used to resolve the contested account. I found no disclosed knife latent-print/DNA result, ejection-location experiment, or body-position reconstruction answering those questions. [4, p. 7] [2, pp. 8–9, 40–62, 79–84] [1, pp. 4, 28, 48]

The Kent County dispatch supervisor and the shop allegations

The referral appears on page 11 of the supplement that identifies Shane Criger and Christopher Hayward as investigators. It describes a Kent County Sheriff’s Department dispatch supervisor, whose name is redacted, relaying what Wilderness Expressions workers told him. The supervisor is not described as witnessing Joey’s traffic stop or shooting, or personally witnessing the shop encounter. Calling this a law-enforcement-linked lead is supported; calling it independent firsthand corroboration is not. [1, pp. 9–11]

The supplement records later interviews with shop witnesses, so the investigation did not stop at that referral. Their accounts require individual treatment: one co-owner did not recognize the driver from news photographs, while another employee said she did. Some identification information came through other delivery drivers and online photographs. The shop’s own recording was reportedly overwritten before the June 21 interviews; Hallmark video was obtained. Those are concrete questions about identification and preservation. [1, pp. 11–15]

Clutch was able to identify the redacted supervisor as Shawn Holtrop, as cited on Holtrop’s Linkedin and Kent County staffing records. [20] The supported finding does not depend on naming him: the referral was a law-enforcement-linked secondhand lead, followed by separately documented witness interviews. [1, pp. 11–15]

Criger’s record and Siver’s role

The people asking these questions about Joey have their own records, and those deserve the same scrutiny. Criger’s involvement in the Raymond McCann investigation is relevant background for scrutiny of his work. The federal docket names Michael Shane Criger as a defendant in McCann’s civil-rights suit, filed in 2019. Prison Legal News reports that Criger worked with Bryan Fuller in the investigation that led to McCann’s wrongful perjury conviction. Its account attributes a later jury verdict to Fuller’s conduct; the precise amount is not used here because that article’s stated total and listed components differ. Those facts warrant careful examination; they do not establish that Criger fabricated evidence in Joey’s case or that the jury returned that verdict against Criger. [11] [12]

There is also an unpublished appellate opinion concerning destroyed evidence in People v. Przewoznik. The 2006 appellate opinion describes Criger’s testimony that meth-lab materials were destroyed under hazardous-materials policy. The court found no showing of bad faith and rejected the due-process claim. Citing the destruction without that disposition would misstate what the court decided. [13, pp. 1–2]

The family account in the supplied draft describes Thomas Siver approaching in the immediate aftermath while Kelly was in shock and expresses dissatisfaction with his representation. The investigative record documents that, on June 20, he advised MSP that his firm represented the family and estate and asked that communication go through his office. It also documents his submission of a witness interview and Facebook screenshots. [1, p. 36]

That interview should be handled fairly. The witness could not confidently identify the age or pitch of the voice he heard shouting “no.” Uncertainty about the voice’s age does not erase his report of repeated shouting followed by a shot, and does not establish that Siver invented the observation. The released police file alone cannot show the complete work performed by the family’s lawyer. It can support a direct question: what steps did counsel take to obtain the missing explanation, test the physical account, and resolve the family’s property concerns? [1, p. 18]

Officers at the scene: misconduct allegations and documented case history

Criger and Siver are not the only names in this file with a record worth checking. Each entry identifies the person’s Nagle role and what the separate record actually establishes. Later lawsuits and rulings are dated explicitly; their existence does not establish what anyone knew in June 2022. Being a defendant, testifying about an investigative failure, and being found liable are different things.

This is a targeted public-record review, not a complete disciplinary-history database or an exhaustive scene roster. “Not verified” means the reviewed sources do not establish the proposition. Bryan Fuller’s McCann verdict remains relevant background to Criger’s history, but no supplied scene record establishes Fuller’s presence at Joey’s shooting, so he is not listed as an on-scene officer.

Prior local arrests and force complaints deserve an audit

Leighton Township’s policing history supplies a concrete lead: the Katherine Lindsey Henry prosecution. The 57th District Court register identifies case 20-3569-SM, citation SD166684, and officer LANGLOIS/MATTHEW, with an alleged offense date of November 3, 2020. This is a court-record connection to a specific prior citation, not speculation from a shared surname. [27, PDF p. 24; printed p. 197]

On July 7, 2022—21 days after Joey’s June 16 shooting—the court granted Henry’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The checked provisions directed destruction of the arrest record and biometric data and removal of the LEIN entry concerning the dismissed charges; a companion order directed immediate destruction and certification to Henry. The underlying prosecution predated Joey’s death; its dismissal followed three weeks later. These orders do not themselves find that Langlois committed misconduct. They do establish an identifiable prior case worth auditing from the initial encounter through the dismissal, including the arrest basis, reports, recordings, prosecutor’s decisions, and reasons for dismissal. They do not identify Joey’s shooter. [28, pp. 1–2]

The shared Leighton/Dorr contract assignment matters. Clutch Justice reports that both cases involved Leighton/Dorr Township contracted deputies. In Joey’s case, the deputy identifies that assignment in his own statement. In Henry’s case, the court register identifies Matthew Langlois, whom Clutch Justice identifies as a Leighton/Dorr contracted deputy. The retained contract roster remains needed to independently substantiate that assignment, as noted above. This connection makes the contract’s staffing, supervision, complaint history, and review of officer conduct specific subjects for investigation. The shared assignment and 21-day interval do not, by themselves, establish that the same deputy was involved or that Henry’s dismissal was connected to Joey’s shooting. [3, p. 1] [27]

There is also a separate Allegan County traffic-stop force case arising from a 2019 encounter, according to Clutch Justice’s reporting. Clutch Justice viewed video and describes Deputy Murphy pulling the driver from the vehicle and beating them. That is Clutch Justice’s firsthand assessment of the footage, not a finding attributed to a court. Clutch Justice reports that Judge Kengis handled the case before it was dismissed on May 16, 2022—one month before Joey’s shooting, and is withholding identifying case details to protect the individual’s privacy. The reported dismissal therefore preceded Joey’s death; the case was not still pending when he was shot. The video account deserves scrutiny even though the case was dismissed. Without the dismissal order, this article does not assign a reason for that outcome or treat it as a ruling that the force was justified. [29]

Institutional self-protection is a question worth investigating

In my assessment, investigators were looking for an out: material from Joey’s life that could shift attention away from the deputy’s decisions and toward the man he killed. That is why Criger’s pursuit and use of Joey’s phone contents matters. The record documents the extraction and Criger’s discussion of selected material about fighting and drug use, while the deputy’s wrong database query and missing verification transactions remain unanswered. The Henry prosecution and Clutch Justice’s viewing of the separate Murphy footage sharpen my concern about how local police conduct was scrutinized. This is my interpretation of the investigative choices, not a motive established by the released documents. The communications, instructions, and selection criteria behind the phone review deserve examination. [1, pp. 44, 48] [2, pp. 37–39]

If investigators were willing to examine Joey’s life down to his phone contents, prior behavior, workplace allegations, and drug history, the deputy’s own verifiable errors and procedural decisions should not receive less scrutiny. The public deserves the same persistence when the subject is the officer who survived.

The tribal-police theory also requires evidence this release does not provide. The reports identify the involved shooter as an Allegan County sheriff’s deputy. The named Gun Lake Tribal Police responders describe arriving after the shot. Their presence does not establish that the shooter worked for the tribal department or that two departments would be liable.

Even proven dual employment would not automatically establish claims against two agencies. Individual and governmental liability are separate questions; tribal sovereign immunity adds another distinction. In Lewis v. Clarke, the Supreme Court distinguished a claim against a tribal employee personally from one against the tribe itself. Employment status alone does not answer who can be sued or on what basis. [14]

WOOD reported Samuel Sterling’s family demanding video and the officer’s name after his death involving an MSP cruiser in April 2024. WOOD report

That story needs its subsequent history. MSP announced the video’s release and referral to the Attorney General on May 10, 2024. The Attorney General charged Brian Keely later that month. A federal judge dismissed the charges on Supremacy Clause immunity grounds on May 28, 2025, finding the necessary-and-proper standard satisfied; the state appealed. Those developments show an accountability dispute involving investigation, prosecution, and immunity, not a case in which no review or prosecution occurred. [15] [16] [17] [18]

McCann and Sterling provide reasons to demand transparent, independently testable findings. Neither substitutes for evidence of what happened to Joey or proves a shared motive among the people involved.

The account still needs to be tested

Strip away the theories, and the record still has to answer for itself.

The physical evidence does not, by itself, validate the deputy’s account of the fatal encounter. MSP sought clarification about the movement of the struggle. The hood inspection found no corroborating damage. The released records do not reconcile the wound path with the claimed body positions or establish the knife’s ownership. Those are material gaps in the explanation of Joseph Nagle’s death.

Koch’s memorandum addresses the stop, force, injuries, Taser, and ACSO use-of-force policy; it does not address the wrong-plate query or the missing verification transactions. [24] The released investigative record documents the deputy querying EJV6675 at 22:03:10 and speaking Joey’s actual plate, EJV6635, over the radio fifty-seven seconds later. It documents no LEIN query of EJV6635 and no driver-license LEIN query. Those findings remain unanswered by a no-charge decision. [1, pp. 37–38]

The family should not have to supply a competing theory before those matters receive answers. A reliable reconstruction needs the substantive July 7 clarification, the scene-access and recovery chronology, the forensic work bearing on disputed items, and a clear accounting of Joey’s property. The deputy’s wrong query is a fact. The missing verification transactions are not documented. No deputy drug or alcohol toxicology result is disclosed in the reviewed material, despite the hospital’s legal-draw entry. Those findings deserve the same clarity and scrutiny applied to allegations about Joey.

Source notes

1. 50-260-22R.pdf, 51 pages. MSP original and supplemental reports, incident 050-0000260-22. Key pages: 2–8 (deputy evidence, searches, hood, shirt and Taser); 22–26 (autopsy evidence); 9–11 (Holscher and recorded aftermath); 18 (witness recontact); 36 (Siver); 37–38 (radio and LEIN summaries); 41–43 (responders); 44–45 (clarification, Taser download, phone); 46–49 (property, medical records, extraction, prosecutor submission).
2. 50-260-22X.pdf, 93 pages. Key pages: 2 (Duesterberg); 4–5 (Austhof/Tatrow); 6–13 (MSP response and survey); 16 (handwritten scene log); 37–39 (CCU extraction); 40–62 (redacted medical material); 63–75 (Taser history); 79–81 (GR22-3102 scene report, record 1); 83–84 (firearms report, record 2); 88 (vehicle release authorization).
3. June 21, 2022 deputy letter, four-page, less-redacted copy supplied as d80cdb7e-dfcb-426c-9cd5-b2ba149eb49f 2.pdf. The counterpart at X pp. 90–93 is more heavily redacted. Date on the letter is not independently verified receipt time.
4. W22-0791_Nagle__Joseph.pdf, eight-page postmortem report signed Jared Brooks, July 25, 2022. Pages 3–4 specify the wound and anatomical direction; p. 7 lists recovered evidence and prints. “Homicide” is the medical manner-of-death classification, not a determination of criminal guilt.
5. 220617-122_Nagle__Joseph_M.pdf, NMS workorder 22216784, issued July 12, 2022, three pages. Interpret findings with specimen type, method, and reporting limits.
6. Associated Press / ClickOnDetroit, September 21, 2022: charging decision.
7. Photos1.zip, Photos2.zip, Photos3.zip, 50 + 50 + 45 images. References: knife 21310995_IMG_0201.jpg and 21310998_IMG_0202.jpg (Photos1); SUV passenger glass 21400694_IMG_7915.JPG.jpg (Photos2); Impala open front windows 21400826_IMG_7959.JPG.jpg and 21400859_IMG_7970.JPG.jpg; keys 21400865_IMG_7972.JPG.jpg; glasses/ID IMG_7973–7977; casing IMG_7985–7987; work light/survey target 21401003_20220617021820.jpg (Photos3). Selected details examined at enlarged resolution; supplied redactions remain intact.
8. Determining the accuracy and errors of estimating a shooter’s position based on cartridge case ejection patterns, Forensic Science International, 328 (2021), 111045.
9. Kerkhoff et al., Magazine Influence on Cartridge Case Ejection Patterns with Glock Pistols, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 63(1), 239–243 (2018).
10. NHTSA SFST Refresher Instructor Manual, revised February 2018, Session 3, p. 20. Supports eyeglass procedure, not the calculator’s assumed durations.
11. McCann v. Fuller et al., W.D. Michigan, 1:19-cv-01032, docket listing.
12. Prison Legal News, $11 Million Settlement for Exonerated Michigan Prisoner, August 15, 2024.
13. People v. Przewoznik, Michigan Court of Appeals, No. 258010, unpublished opinion, January 12, 2006.
14. Lewis v. Clarke, U.S. Supreme Court, April 25, 2017. Individual-capacity claims and tribal sovereign immunity.
15. MSP statement on the Sterling investigation and video release, May 10, 2024.
16. Michigan Attorney General charging announcement, May 28, 2024.
17. Michigan v. Keely, No. 1:24-cr-115, ECF 109, W.D. Michigan, May 28, 2025. Dismissal opinion.
18. Michigan v. Brian Keely, Sixth Circuit No. 25-1573, appeal docket. This article describes the documented appeal filing, not a verified final appellate disposition.
19. Karie Herringa, “’I just kept letting him hit me’: MSP release report on shooting death of Joseph Nagle,” FOX17, September 16, 2022.
20. Rita Williams, “Shot in the Dark: The Death of Joseph Nagle and the Missing Record of Justice,” Clutch Justice, September 3, 2025. Earlier reporting.
21. Wayback Machine snapshot, Allegan County contracted-patrols page, captured June 10, 2022.
22. MCOLES Basic Training Module V-B-4, Stopping Vehicles and Occupant Control. Objectives V.B.4.1 and V.B.4.3; history lists reviews in September 2021 and November 2023.
23. MCOLES Basic Training Module V-B-1, Vehicle and Driver Licensing. Objectives V.B.1.1 and V.B.1.3; history lists reviews in September 2021 and November 2023. The review history does not establish unchanged wording since 2021.
24. Myrene K. Koch, memorandum to Det/Lt. Shane Criger, September 16, 2022, eight-page document reproduced by WZZM News on Scribd. The memorandum’s text, rather than the hosting page’s AI-generated description, supplies the cited findings. It is a prosecutor’s assessment; the complete ACSO policy it references is not reproduced here.
25. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Supreme Court opinion on an administrative inventory of an impounded vehicle.
26. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Supreme Court opinion addressing standardized inventory procedures and impoundment criteria.
27. Henry appellate appendix, reproduced court register, PDF p. 24, printed p. 197. The 57th District Court register connects Katherine Lindsey Henry, case 20-3569-SM, SD166684, and LANGLOIS/MATTHEW. Court record reproduced on the litigant’s website; advocacy elsewhere in the appendix is not adopted as a judicial finding.
28. Henry dismissal and biometric-data/arrest-record orders, July 7, 2022, two pages, certified copies linked from Henry’s July 12, 2022 Restore Freedom post. Checked boxes and dates visually reviewed. Destruction and LEIN removal were ordered; these copies do not establish agency compliance.
29. Clutch Justice’s firsthand video account and author-supplied account of a separate Deputy Murphy traffic-stop force case, arising from a 2019 encounter, including Judge Kengis’s involvement and dismissal on May 16, 2022. These dates come from the author’s reporting. Identifying case details are withheld for privacy. The underlying video and docket were not supplied for this edit; no judicial finding about the force or reason for dismissal is asserted.