Michigan already has the authority to decide motions on the papers, hold non-evidentiary proceedings remotely, and tax costs against the party that forces a wasted appearance. The rules exist. The form field exists. What is missing is any price on a citizen’s time worth paying attention to, and any published number that would tell the public how often their day is taken for nothing.
Michigan court rules already permit judges to decide motions without oral argument, to hold most non-evidentiary proceedings by video, and to assess costs against a party who causes an adjournment. Those powers are discretionary and unevenly used. Meanwhile MCL 600.2552 values a witness’s full day in court at twelve dollars, a figure unchanged since 2000, while the same statute automatically indexes mileage reimbursement to the current state employee rate. Michigan demonstrated it knows how to solve this when it raised juror pay under MCL 600.1344, created a reimbursement fund, criminalized firing someone for jury service, and funded a State Court Administrative Office position tasked in part with reducing unnecessary summonses. Every element of that response was scoped to jurors. Reform does not require inventing new judicial authority. It requires flipping three defaults, pricing an appearance at something honest, and publishing the data.
Rita Williams is a party to active civil litigation in Michigan courts and appears in those matters as a self-represented litigant. That experience informs the observational sections of this piece. No pending matter involving the author is described, cited, or used as evidence here. Every institutional claim in this article rests on published court rules, statutes, SCAO forms, and state judicial reporting, all of which are cited and independently verifiable.
- The authority already exists. MCR 2.119(E)(3) permits a Michigan court to dispense with or limit oral argument on motions and require briefing instead. The Court of Appeals reviews that call for abuse of discretion.
- The cost mechanism already exists. MCR 2.503(D)(2) allows a court granting an adjournment to impose costs, tax them summarily, and vacate the adjournment for nonpayment. SCAO Form MC 309 contains a blank line for the amount.
- The price is twelve dollars. MCL 600.2552 sets the daily witness fee at twelve dollars, or documented lost working time capped at fifteen. Last amended by 2000 PA 85. Subsection five indexes mileage automatically. Nothing indexes the human.
- Michigan already fixed this for jurors. MCL 600.1344 sets juror pay at floors of twenty-five and forty dollars, rising to thirty and forty-five when the reimbursement fund allows. MCL 600.1348 makes firing someone for jury service a misdemeanor. MCL 600.151e funds an SCAO position tasked in part with reducing unnecessary summonses. None of it reaches witnesses or parties.
- The enforcement runs one direction. A person who fails to appear faces contempt, costs, struck pleadings, or a bench warrant, with contempt penalties reaching a fine or jail. A court or party that wastes a person’s day faces a discretionary cost provision almost nobody invokes.
- The measurement is missing. Michigan publishes clearance rate, time to disposition, and age of pending caseload. Trial date certainty, the national measure of whether a proceeding happens when scheduled, is not among the published Michigan measures. Massachusetts publishes its version.
Can a Michigan judge decide a motion without making anyone appear?
Yes. MCR 2.119(E)(3) gives the court discretion to dispense with or limit oral argument and to require the parties to brief the issue instead. MCR 2.116(G)(1) applies the same authority to summary disposition motions. The decision is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.
What is a day of a citizen’s time worth under Michigan law?
Twelve dollars for a full day, six for a half day, under MCL 600.2552. A witness who documents lost working time may be paid for it, but no more than fifteen dollars per day is taxable as the witness fee. The provision was last amended effective October 1, 2000.
Can a court make someone pay for an adjournment they caused?
Yes. Under MCR 2.503(D)(2), a court granting an adjournment may impose costs and conditions. Those costs may be taxed summarily and paid on demand of the adverse party, and the adjournment may be vacated if nonpayment is shown. The authority is permissive, not mandatory.
Do Michigan jurors get paid more than witnesses?
Substantially more. Juror compensation runs under MCL 600.1344, a separate section, at floors of twenty-five dollars for the first full day and forty for each subsequent day, rising to thirty and forty-five when the juror compensation reimbursement fund permits. Those figures were raised by 2017 PA 51 effective April 1, 2018. The witness fee under MCL 600.2552 has not moved since 2000.
Does Michigan track how often hearings get adjourned?
Individual courts do. Livingston County, for example, classifies and tracks adjournments by reason under its local policy, and MCR 2.503(B) requires a request to state how many prior adjournments were granted. What does not exist is a published statewide measure of appearance burden comparable to the trial date certainty figures other states report.
The Meeting That Should Have Been an Email Has a Courthouse Version
I have sat in a Michigan courtroom for two hours to watch a proceeding resolve in ninety seconds. Not an evidentiary hearing. Not a trial. A scheduling matter that had already been briefed, already been stipulated to in substance, and already been decided in every meaningful respect before anyone drove anywhere. The judge was efficient. The attorneys were prepared. Nobody did anything wrong. The system worked exactly as designed, and the design consumed most of a working day from every person in the gallery.
That is the part worth sitting with. The waste was not misconduct. It was procedure operating normally.
The corporate world developed a shorthand for this, and it stuck because it named something everyone already recognized. A meeting that could have been an email is a meeting whose entire informational content could have been transmitted in writing, but which happened in a room anyway because the room was on the calendar. The courthouse version is worse in three specific ways. Attendance is compelled rather than expected. The cost of nonattendance is a sanction rather than a raised eyebrow. And the people bearing the cost are almost never the people who scheduled it.
Michigan does not lack the tools to fix this. That is the finding this piece is built around, and it changes the shape of the argument considerably. The usual reform conversation asks a legislature to grant courts a power they do not have. Here, the powers are already on the books, in three separate court rules, with a state-approved form containing a blank line for the dollar amount. What is missing is the default setting, the price, and the number.
What the Rules Already Allow
Start with the motion. Under MCR 2.119(E)(3), a Michigan court may in its discretion dispense with or limit oral argument on motions and may require the parties to file briefs in support of and in opposition to the motion. MCR 2.116(G)(1) extends the same principle to summary disposition. The Michigan Court of Appeals has treated the decision to omit oral argument as reviewable for abuse of discretion, and has upheld its use where the briefing was thorough enough that argument would have added nothing. The corresponding limit is meaningful and worth stating plainly: a court abuses that discretion if a party is deprived of the opportunity to respond to the opposing party’s arguments. Deciding on the papers is not permission to decide without hearing from someone.
Michigan business courts already run this way in practice. Orders issued out of the Oakland County business docket routinely state that oral argument is dispensed with under MCR 2.119(E)(3) because it would not assist the court in its decision-making process. The mechanism functions. It is simply optional, and optional mechanisms get used by the judges inclined to use them and ignored by the ones who are not.
The federal courthouse across the street handles this differently in one small but structurally important way. Under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), when a judge decides to resolve a motion without oral argument, the court issues an affirmative document saying so. A notice of determination of motion without oral argument goes on the docket, gets served on the parties, and tells everyone in writing not to come. Michigan state practice generally leaves the parties to find out that argument was dispensed with when the order arrives, or to appear and discover it in the room.
The difference between the federal and state approach is not the power to decide on the papers. Both have it. The difference is whether the system generates an affirmative communication that saves the parties a trip. One treats the notice as a docket event. The other treats it as a byproduct.
Then there is the remote question. MCR 2.407 governs videoconferencing in Michigan civil proceedings, with MCR 2.408 and Administrative Order No. 2020-17 layered on top. The rule is more permissive than most people assume. Certain proceedings carry a presumption in favor of videoconferencing, subject to a court’s determination that a particular case is unsuited to it. The factors a court weighs under MCR 2.407(C) already include the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the cost of producing witnesses in person. Cost and convenience are not afterthoughts smuggled in by reformers. They are enumerated considerations in the existing rule.
The rule also protects the thing that ought to be protected. Nothing in it prevents a person who has the right to appear in person from demanding to do so, and MCR 2.407(B)(5) preserves a court’s authority to require an in-person hearing even in a presumptively remote category. That combination matters for the reform argument, because it means expanding remote defaults does not require dismantling anyone’s right to physical presence. The opt-out is already written.
Twelve Dollars
Here is where the record turns from an efficiency problem into an accountability problem.
MCL 600.2552(1) provides that a witness who attends an action or proceeding pending in a court of record shall be paid a witness fee of twelve dollars for each day and six dollars for each half day. A witness may instead be paid for loss of working time, but not more than fifteen dollars per day is taxable as costs as the witness fee. Twelve dollars is what Michigan law says a day of your life is worth when the court requires you to spend it in a hallway.
The statutory history is the part that does the analytical work. The current figures trace to amendments effective in 2000, under 2000 PA 85. That same amendment added subsection five, which provides that the per-mile reimbursement rate for a witness’s travel is the same rate the Department of Management and Budget establishes for state officers and unclassified state employees on state business. In other words, in the same legislative act, Michigan built an automatic escalator into the mileage figure and left the human figure fixed.
Twenty-six years later, the mileage rate has moved every time the state adjusted its own travel reimbursement. The twelve dollars has not moved at all. A person subpoenaed to a Michigan courtroom in 2026 is compensated for the wear on their vehicle at a contemporary rate and compensated for their labor at a rate set when gas was around a dollar fifty a gallon.
An institution reveals its priorities in what it indexes. Michigan indexed the cost of the car and froze the cost of the person, in the same act, on the same day, by the same legislature.
Run the arithmetic against any real Michigan wage and the compensation stops functioning as compensation. A person earning the state minimum wage loses substantially more in a single unpaid shift than the fee restores. A person on hourly work with no paid leave loses the shift, the fee does not cover it, and the arithmetic gets worse for anyone who needed childcare or paid for parking. For the self-represented litigant, who is not a witness at all and therefore outside the fee structure entirely, the recovery is zero.
Michigan Already Solved This Problem. For One Group.
The obvious objection to everything above is that courts simply cannot afford to value a citizen’s day realistically, that the money does not exist, and that twelve dollars reflects fiscal reality rather than institutional indifference. That objection collapses on contact with MCL 600.1344.
Jurors are compensated under an entirely separate section of the same act. Under MCL 600.1344, a juror receives not less than twenty-five dollars for the first full day and not less than forty dollars for each subsequent full day, with half-day rates proportionate. Where the state court administrator, at the direction of the Supreme Court and with confirmation by the state treasurer, determines that sufficient money is available in the juror compensation reimbursement fund, those floors rise to thirty and forty-five dollars.
That structure did not arrive by accident. Public Acts 51 and 52 of 2017 raised the juror compensation minimums and doubled the juror mileage floor from ten cents to twenty cents per mile, effective April 1, 2018. The Legislature also created a dedicated reimbursement fund so that county funding units would not absorb the increase alone.
The protections extend past money. Under MCL 600.1348, an employer who threatens, disciplines, or discharges a person because that person was summoned for jury duty or served on a jury is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished for contempt of court. There is no general equivalent for a witness. The employment protections that exist for court attendance are narrow and category-specific: crime victims subpoenaed by a prosecutor are protected under MCL 780.762, with a misdemeanor penalty of up to ninety days or five hundred dollars, and employees participating in a court action connected to a report of suspected legal violations are protected under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act at MCL 15.362. An ordinary civil witness, subpoenaed by a private litigant to sit in a hallway for six hours, has neither.
Then there is the provision that settles the question of whether Michigan understands this problem. MCL 600.151e authorizes the state court administrator to draw on the juror compensation reimbursement fund to support a position within the State Court Administrative Office providing technical assistance to trial courts on jury management. The stated purposes of that position include improving efficiency and reducing the number of citizens summoned unnecessarily for jury service. The same subsection authorizes funding a statewide jury management software contract toward the same end.
Michigan diagnosed the problem of citizens summoned to a courthouse and not used. It responded with a raised statutory rate, an indexing mechanism, a dedicated reimbursement fund, criminal employment protection, statewide management software, and a funded staff position whose job description includes reducing unnecessary summonses. It scoped every element of that response to jurors, and left every other compelled attendee at twelve dollars and no job protection.
The distinction is not defensible on principle. A juror and a subpoenaed witness lose the same day, absorb the same wage loss, arrange the same childcare, and drive the same distance. The one difference that actually explains the gap is institutional: the court system summons jurors on its own behalf, so the cost of wasting them lands on the court’s own budget and its own ability to seat panels. Witnesses and parties are summoned by litigants, and the cost of wasting them lands outside the building entirely.
An institution that cannot afford to value anyone’s time does not build a reimbursement fund, hire a specialist, and buy software to stop wasting one category of person.
An institution that has done all three has demonstrated both the capacity and the concept. What remains is a decision about who counts, and Michigan has been making that decision the same way since 2000.
Enter what a court appearance actually costs you. The calculator compares your real loss against what Michigan law currently restores under MCL 600.2552. Nothing is transmitted or stored.
Statutory recovery figure reflects MCL 600.2552(1), which caps the taxable witness fee at twelve dollars per full day, or documented lost working time not exceeding fifteen dollars per day. Self-represented litigants appearing as parties rather than witnesses fall outside this fee structure entirely and recover nothing. Mileage is shown separately because subsection five indexes it to the current state employee rate.
The Lab holds the Clutch Justice interactive tools, databases, and explainers, including court navigation resources, FOIA drafting help, and the judicial misconduct record. Built for litigants, researchers, and reporters working without institutional support.
Open The Lab ?The Asymmetry Nobody Designed and Everybody Maintains
Consider the two failure modes side by side, because Michigan law treats them very differently.
When a person fails to appear, the machinery is comprehensive. Failure to comply with a subpoena may be treated as contempt of the court in which the action is pending under MCR 2.506(E). Where a party fails to attend under a subpoena or an order to attend, MCR 2.506(F) permits the court to stay proceedings, tax costs to that party, strike all or part of their pleadings, or refuse to allow them to support or oppose designated claims. Contempt penalties under Michigan law reach a substantial fine, and imprisonment for contempt generally may not exceed ninety-three days. On the criminal side, MCL 764.3 addresses bench warrants for failure to appear, with a stated presumption in favor of waiting forty-eight hours and a requirement that a court departing from that presumption state its reasons on the record.
That is a layered, well-specified, actively enforced system. It reflects a considered judgment that a person’s failure to show up damages the administration of justice and should carry consequences proportionate to that damage.
Now the mirror. When a proceeding is noticed, a person rearranges their life, loses a shift, arranges childcare, drives to the courthouse, and the matter is adjourned at the podium or resolved in a manner that required no appearance at all, the available response is MCR 2.503(D)(2). The court may impose costs. May.
Michigan has built mandatory, escalating, jail-backed consequences for a citizen who wastes the court’s time, and a single discretionary sentence for an institution or opposing party that wastes the citizen’s. Both failures impose real costs on real people. Only one of them is priced like it matters.
This is not an accusation of bad faith against any judge. It is a description of an incentive structure. Judges manage crowded dockets under performance measures that count how fast cases close, not how many hours the public spent in hallways. Attorneys notice hearings because noticing a hearing is the reliable way to get a decision, and because a hearing costs the attorney billable time that the client pays for rather than absorbs. Nobody in that structure is punished for scheduling an unnecessary appearance. Several people are rewarded for it.
The Box Nobody Checks
SCAO Form MC 309 is the approved order for adjournment under MCR 2.503. It has been in circulation in substantially its current form since a 2001 revision. The form contains a line reading that costs are assessed in a stated amount, payable to a named party, by a stated date.
The blank exists. The rule authorizing it exists. The enforcement mechanism behind it exists, and it has teeth: costs imposed as a condition of adjournment may be taxed summarily and paid on demand of the adverse party or that party’s attorney, and the adjournment itself may be vacated if nonpayment is shown by a verified written statement. A party who obtains a delay and then declines to pay for it can lose the delay.
Michigan built a complete, self-enforcing cost-recovery mechanism for wasted appearances, printed it on a state-approved form, and made it optional. The result is predictable. Local practice varies enormously, most adjournment orders issue with the cost line blank, and the parties who bear the cost of the delay have no reliable way to recover it and often no idea the line exists.
A reform that changes one word in MCR 2.503(D)(2) from permissive to presumptive, with a good cause exception and an express carve-out for indigent and self-represented parties, requires no new statute, no new form, no new appropriation, and no new judicial authority. It requires the Michigan Supreme Court to amend a rule it already wrote.
What Michigan Does Not Measure
Michigan collects a great deal of court data. Trial courts submit annual caseload reports through the Michigan Court Application Portal under MCR 8.103 and MCR 8.110, and most of that data now flows into the state’s Interactive Court Data Dashboard. The published performance measures cover clearance rate, time to disposition, age of pending caseload, problem-solving court recidivism, and public satisfaction.
Michigan also requires judges to report on themselves in one specific respect. Under MCR 8.107, trial judges submit quarterly reports on delay in matters submitted, disclosing matters held under advisement beyond the permitted period. The state considered judicial delay in deciding a submitted matter serious enough to warrant a mandatory, recurring, individualized self-report.
There is no equivalent for delay imposed on the public. Michigan’s published measures do not include a trial date certainty or event date certainty figure, which is the national measure, catalogued as CourTools Measure 5 by the National Center for State Courts, of how often a proceeding is held on the first date it was scheduled. The measure exists specifically to evaluate the effectiveness of calendaring and continuance practices. Massachusetts publishes its version in the Trial Court’s regular case flow metrics reports, alongside clearance rate and time to disposition, and has done so across multiple reporting years.
The absence is analytically significant on its own terms. An institution measures what it intends to manage. Michigan measures how long the court takes to finish a case and how long a judge takes to decide a submitted motion. It does not measure, at least not publicly, how many times it told a citizen to appear and then did not use them.
The only component of Michigan’s appearance system operating at full strength is the one that punishes the citizen. Every mechanism pointing the other direction exists on paper and runs on discretion.
The Framework: Four Changes
A serious reform has to survive contact with the people who run courtrooms, which means it cannot start from the premise that judges are the problem. Docket pressure is real, oral argument genuinely helps in some matters, and a rule that makes judges afraid to schedule hearings will produce worse decisions. The framework below is built to change defaults and generate data, not to second-guess individual calendaring judgment.
One: A papers-first presumption for non-evidentiary motions
Where a motion presents a question of law, has been fully briefed, and requires no testimony, the presumption should run toward decision on the papers, with the court retaining full authority to call for argument in any matter where argument would assist it. Critically, either party should be able to request argument, and that request should be granted absent stated reasons. The existing constraint from the case law carries forward: no party may be deprived of the opportunity to respond to the other side’s arguments. This is a default flip within existing authority, not a new limit on the right to be heard.
Two: Affirmative notice when appearance is excused
Borrowing directly from Eastern District of Michigan practice, when a court determines a matter will be resolved without oral argument, that determination should generate a docket entry served on the parties. The current failure mode is not that Michigan courts lack the power to cancel a hearing. It is that a canceled hearing frequently does not reach the person driving to it.
Three: Presumptive cost assessment for late-vacated proceedings
Where a proceeding is adjourned, canceled, or resolved without appearance within a short window before the scheduled time, and a party or witness has already been noticed, the court should assess compensation to each person who appeared or made irrevocable arrangements, unless good cause is shown. The mechanism is MCR 2.503(D)(2) with the permissive verb replaced. The essential protections are that no assessment runs against a party proceeding without fees on indigency grounds absent bad faith, and that the assessment attaches to the party who caused the delay rather than to the fact of delay itself.
Four: Published appearance burden data
Trial courts already report caseload data annually through MCAP. Adding scheduled non-evidentiary proceedings, proceedings adjourned, proceedings resolved without appearance, and median wait time to the existing reporting stream is an incremental data collection change, not a new bureaucracy. Publishing it through the Interactive Court Data Dashboard puts it where the public and the press can use it. Data is the mechanism that makes the other three self-correcting, because a court that can see its own adjournment rate can manage it.
Draft Statutory and Rule Text
Michigan’s constitutional structure splits this reform in two. Under Const 1963, art 6, sec 5, the Michigan Supreme Court establishes and amends the practice and procedure of all state courts by general rule. The default flips and the notice requirement are therefore Supreme Court rulemaking matters, not legislative ones. The compensation rate is different, because witness fees are already fixed by statute in MCL 600.2552, which means changing the number requires the Legislature. Reporting can travel either route. What follows is drafted accordingly.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the “court time accountability act.”
As used in this act: (a) “Compelled appearance” means physical or remote attendance at a court proceeding required by subpoena, order to attend, notice of hearing, or condition of bond or probation. (b) “Non-evidentiary proceeding” means a proceeding at which no sworn testimony is taken and no exhibit is admitted. (c) “Appearance burden” means the aggregate time and expense imposed on parties, witnesses, and other required attendees by compelled appearances in a case.
Section 2552 of the revised judicature act of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.2552, is amended so that the attendance fee payable to a witness is not less than the compensation payable to a juror for a corresponding day or half day of actual attendance under section 1344. A person who documents actual loss of working time, wages, self-employment income, or dependent care expense attributable to a compelled appearance shall be paid the documented amount in lieu of the attendance fee.
The attendance fee under this section shall adjust automatically with each adjustment to juror compensation under section 1344, without further amendment of this section, in the same manner that the per-mile reimbursement rate adjusts under subsection (5) of section 2552.
A party who appears at a compelled appearance in propria persona is entitled to compensation under section 3 on the same terms as a witness. The court shall not condition that entitlement on representation by counsel.
An employer or an employer’s agent who threatens to discharge or discipline, or who discharges, disciplines, or causes to be discharged or disciplined, a person because that person is subpoenaed, ordered, or noticed to attend a court proceeding, or attends a court proceeding in compliance with a subpoena, order, or notice, is guilty of a misdemeanor and may also be punished for contempt of court, in the same manner provided for jury service under section 1348.
(1) If a scheduled proceeding is adjourned, canceled, or determined without appearance fewer than 48 hours before the scheduled time, and a party or witness has been served with notice of the proceeding, the court shall assess compensation under section 3 against the party whose act or omission caused the adjournment, cancellation, or determination, payable to each person who appeared or who demonstrates that arrangements made in reliance on the notice could not be canceled.
(2) The court may decline to assess compensation on the record for good cause, including illness, emergency, an intervening order of a higher court, an act of the court not attributable to a party, or a settlement reached in good faith.
(3) The court shall not assess compensation under this section against a party whose fees have been waived or suspended on grounds of indigency, or against a party appearing in propria persona, unless the court finds on the record that the party acted in bad faith.
(4) Compensation assessed under this section may be taxed summarily and enforced in the manner provided by MCR 2.503(D)(2).
(1) Each trial court shall report annually to the state court administrative office, in the manner prescribed for caseload reporting: the number of non-evidentiary proceedings scheduled; the number adjourned or canceled; the number determined without appearance; the number of assessments made and declined under section 6; and the median interval between a scheduled proceeding time and the time the matter was called.
(2) The state court administrative office shall publish the data required under subsection (1) at the individual court level, in a publicly accessible format, not later than 180 days after the close of each reporting year.
This act does not create a private cause of action, does not limit a court’s authority to require in-person appearance, does not limit any right to appear in person, and does not limit the court’s contempt power.
The Objections, Taken Seriously
Three counterarguments deserve real answers rather than dismissal, and one of them is strong enough to constrain the design.
Oral argument is not decoration. Judges and appellate practitioners will point out, correctly, that argument surfaces things briefs do not. A judge’s question can expose a weakness neither party addressed. A pro se litigant who wrote a confusing brief may be entirely coherent in person. The framework accommodates this by preserving the court’s authority to call for argument in any matter and by making a party’s request for argument presumptively granted. A papers-first default is not a papers-only rule, and any version that becomes one should be opposed.
Remote proceedings are not neutral across the population. This is the objection that carries the most weight. Broadband access is uneven across Michigan, particularly in rural counties. A person appearing by phone from a parking lot is not participating on equal terms with an attorney appearing from a firm conference room. Remote appearance can also make it harder for a judge to detect coercion in domestic matters, a concern Michigan’s own domestic violence prevention board raised in commenting on the videoconferencing rules. This is why the framework treats remote appearance as a default the litigant can decline rather than a mandate, and why MCR 2.407(B)(5), which preserves the court’s power to require in-person attendance in any case, is load-bearing rather than incidental.
Cost-shifting can be weaponized. Any fee-shifting mechanism can be turned against the party with less money. A well-resourced litigant can absorb assessments that would deter an unrepresented person from filing a legitimate motion. This is a real risk and it is the reason the draft contains an express prohibition on assessments against indigent and self-represented parties absent a bad faith finding on the record. A reform that makes courthouses more expensive for poor litigants would be worse than the problem it addresses. The assessment has to run toward the parties with counsel and resources or it should not exist.
There is a fourth objection worth naming because it is the one that will actually be made in practice, usually informally: that this is a small problem. That hearings are short, delays are ordinary, and everyone in the system deals with the same inefficiency.
Everyone in the system does not deal with the same inefficiency. The attorney bills the wait. The judge is at work. The court staff is at work. The person who took unpaid leave, arranged childcare, and drove forty minutes is the only participant whose time is uncompensated, unmeasured, and unprotected. Calling that shared inconvenience requires not looking at who is actually holding the cost.
Why This Matters
Court legitimacy is not primarily built in the cases people read about. It is built in the accumulated experience of ordinary people who had to be somewhere at nine in the morning and found out at eleven-fifteen that nothing was going to happen. Most people’s entire relationship with the judicial branch is a traffic matter, a landlord-tenant docket, a custody review, or a day spent as a witness. What they learn in that hallway is what they believe about whether the system takes them seriously.
Michigan does not need permission to fix this, and it does not need a proof of concept. It ran the pilot. It raised the rate, built the fund, wrote the criminal penalty, bought the software, and hired the analyst, and it did all of that for the one category of attendee whose wasted time shows up on the court’s own ledger. What remains is extending a solution the state already built to the people it left out of it.
I have spent enough hours in enough hallways to know that nobody in the building is trying to waste my day. That is precisely the point. When waste requires no bad actor, no misconduct, and no complaint anyone would sustain, the only thing that fixes it is a rule that makes the waste visible and a price that makes it count. Michigan wrote the rule. It printed the form. It left the line blank, and it has left it blank for twenty-six years.
Check the box.
Mich Ct R 2.119, Motion Practice, subrule (E)(3) (discretion to dispense with or limit oral argument).
Mich Ct R 2.116(G)(1) (application of MCR 2.119(E)(3) to summary disposition motions).
Mich Ct R 2.503, Adjournments, subrules (B), (D)(2), and (E).
Mich Ct R 2.407, Videoconferencing, subrules (B)(5), (B)(10), and (C); Mich Ct R 2.408; Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2020-17.
Mich Ct R 2.506, Subpoena and Order to Attend, subrules (E), (F), (G), and (H).
Mich Ct R 8.107 (quarterly reporting of delay in matters submitted); Mich Ct R 8.103 and 8.110 (caseload reporting).
Michigan Court Rules of 1985, updated May 1, 2026, Michigan Supreme Court.
Michigan StatutesMCL 600.2552, Witness fees; traveling expenses; per-mile rate of reimbursement, as amended by 2000 PA 85, effective October 1, 2000.
MCL 600.1344 (juror compensation rates and reimbursement fund contingency), as amended by 2017 PA 51, effective April 1, 2018.
MCL 600.1348 (employer penalty for discharging or disciplining a person for jury service).
MCL 600.151e (juror compensation reimbursement fund; authorization for jury management software and an SCAO position addressing unnecessary summonses), as amended by 2017 PA 52.
MCL 780.762 (employment protection for crime victims subpoenaed to testify); MCL 15.362, Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, 1980 PA 469 (protection for employees participating in a court action).
MCL 24.273 (administrative agency subpoenas; witness fees paid in accordance with MCL 600.2552).
MCL 600.1715(1) (contempt penalties); MCL 600.1701 (contempt authority).
MCL 764.3 (bench warrant for failure to appear; 48-hour presumption; requirement to state reasons on the record).
MCL 18.1217 (state travel reimbursement rate referenced by MCL 600.2552(5)).
Const 1963, art 6, sec 5 (Supreme Court authority over practice and procedure).
Case Law and BenchbooksPeople v Bogucki, Mich App (discussing MCR 2.119(E)(3), abuse of discretion standard, and the limit where a party is deprived of an opportunity to respond), as summarized in Michigan Judicial Institute, Criminal Proceedings Benchbook, Pretrial Procedures Generally.
Michigan Judicial Institute, Civil Proceedings Benchbook, chapters on Subpoenas and Reconsideration or Rehearing.
Michigan Judicial Institute, Contempt of Court Benchbook, Failure of Witness to Appear or Testify; Failure of Defendant to Appear for Court Hearing.
Forms and Administrative RecordsSCAO Approved Form MC 309, Order for Adjournment (rev. 9/01), containing the costs assessment field.
Michigan Supreme Court, business court opinions dispensing with oral argument under MCR 2.119(E)(3), Oakland County Business Court, 2026.
Livingston County Circuit Court, Adjournment Policy adopting MCR 2.503(B) and requiring classification and tracking of adjournments by reason.
State Court Administrative Office, memorandum on juror mileage and compensation rate increases effective April 1, 2018 (Kevin McKay, Jury Management Analyst).
Court Performance DataMichigan Courts, Caseload Reports, Performance Measures Data, and Interactive Court Data Dashboard, State Court Administrative Office.
National Center for State Courts, CourTools Measure 5, Trial Date Certainty.
Massachusetts Executive Office of the Trial Court, Case Flow Metrics Reports (trial date certainty and event date certainty reporting across multiple fiscal years).
Comparative Federal PracticeUnited States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Local Rule 7.1(f)(2) (determination of motion without oral argument), and docketed notices of determination issued under that rule.
Bluebook: Williams, Rita. Court Could Have Been an Email, Clutch Justice (Aug. 2, 2026), https://clutchjustice.com/2026/08/02/court-could-have-been-an-email/.
APA 7: Williams, R. (2026, August 2). Court could have been an email. Clutch Justice. https://clutchjustice.com/2026/08/02/court-could-have-been-an-email/
MLA 9: Williams, Rita. “Court Could Have Been an Email.” Clutch Justice, 2 Aug. 2026, clutchjustice.com/2026/08/02/court-could-have-been-an-email/.
Chicago: Williams, Rita. “Court Could Have Been an Email.” Clutch Justice, August 2, 2026. https://clutchjustice.com/2026/08/02/court-could-have-been-an-email/.
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