Between 2010 and 2025 the Michigan Office of the Auditor General published eleven facility-level examinations of prison safety and security. Seven found failures in the arsenal, in weapons records, or in weapons permits. The Department agreed with every recommendation. The specific control the auditors flagged in 2011, and flagged again in 2013, is the control that governed the job an arsenal sergeant at Bellamy Creek held until February 2026.
Michigan does not have a documented, publicly verifiable count of the weapons and munitions held inside its correctional facilities, and the state’s own auditors have been reporting the reasons for that since at least December 2010. Clutch Justice reviewed every facility-level safety and security performance audit the Office of the Auditor General released from December 2010 through March 2025. Eleven audits. Seven contained findings involving arsenal inventory records, weapons issuance documentation, weapons permits, or arsenal inspection compliance.
In two of those reports the auditors identified the same structural defect: the master weapons inventory was maintained by the same employee who issued and received the weapons. Auditors recommended in 2011 that an independent party hold that record. They repeated the recommendation in 2013. The Department agreed both times.
Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility was audited once in the last twenty years, in October 2015. Arsenal inventories and operations were inside the audit scope. No arsenal finding was reported, and the facility was found to have generally complied. The same audit reported that 56 of 95 gate manifests reviewed were not fully completed. Gate manifests are the records the state uses to control the theft of its own property.
One point of balance belongs at the front, not buried: where auditors physically counted weapons, they generally found them. The recurring failure is not a pile of missing firearms. It is the condition of the records and inspections that would surface a loss in between counts, and the absence of any mechanism that holds a fix in place after the auditors leave.
This analysis is built from primary documents: performance audit reports and report summaries published by the Michigan Office of the Auditor General, the Michigan Compiled Laws, and State Court Administrative Office forms. Every audit referenced is linked in the sources block. Figures are taken directly from the audit text.
Clutch Justice has submitted public records requests to state agencies regarding weapons accountability. Some were declined. Others remain pending. The disposition of those requests will be reported in a subsequent installment rather than characterized here.
References to the criminal matter involving a former Bellamy Creek arsenal sergeant describe allegations. The case has not been adjudicated, and nothing in this analysis should be read as a finding of guilt.
What an Arsenal Is, and Why the Record Is the Whole Control
A prison arsenal is a room. What makes it a control is not the lock. It is the list.
Every Michigan correctional facility maintains a master weapons inventory identifying each firearm by serial number. Shift supervisors perform daily counts. The arsenal sergeant performs weekly and monthly counts. Business office staff are supposed to conduct an annual audit reconciling the record to the physical inventory. The purpose of that layered structure is not redundancy for its own sake. It exists because a firearm that is not on the list cannot be reported missing, and a firearm whose serial number on the list does not match the serial number on the weapon cannot be traced.
Everything downstream depends on the record being accurate. If the list is wrong, the daily count still clears. The weekly count still clears. The monthly count still clears. The system reports normal operation because it is comparing weapons against a document that does not describe them.
A count reconciles the room to the record. It does not reconcile the record to reality. When the record is the thing that is broken, every count that follows is a confirmation of the error.
Eleven Audits, Fifteen Years, One Recurring Finding
The Office of the Auditor General conducts performance audits under Article IV, Section 53 of the Michigan Constitution. Its corrections audits are prepared on an exception basis, meaning the office reports what it found wrong rather than certifying what it found right. Facilities are selected on a risk basis, not a rotation, which is why some prisons appear twice in twenty-five years and others do not appear at all.
Clutch Justice located and reviewed the complete set of facility-level safety and security performance audits published in the Auditor General’s corrections archive between December 2010 and March 2025. The census below reflects what each report stated in its own findings.
| Facility | Report No. | Released | Arsenal or weapons finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Newberry | 471-0221-10 | Dec 2010 | Yes |
| Ryan | 471-0232-10 | Apr 2011 | Yes |
| St. Louis | 471-0249-11 | Sep 2011 | Yes, two findings |
| Central Michigan | 471-0276-12 | Sep 2012 | Yes |
| Macomb | 471-0216-13 | Sep 2013 | Yes |
| Pugsley | 471-0247-13 | Dec 2013 | No |
| Bellamy Creek | 471-0208-15 | Oct 2015 | No |
| Oaks | 471-0222-15 | Dec 2015 | No |
| Baraga | 471-0207-23 | Mar 2025 | No |
| Richard A. Handlon | 471-0215-23 | Mar 2025 | Yes |
| Ionia | 471-0233-23 | Mar 2025 | Yes, two findings |
The individual findings are worth stating precisely, because the aggregate is easy to wave away and the particulars are not.
The business office completed a physical arsenal inventory in February 2010 but did not verify serial numbers against its perpetual record. Auditors determined that 8 rifles and 4 gas guns physically present were not the same 8 rifles and 4 gas guns identified on that record. Eight rifles purchased in October 2008 had never been added. Four gas guns purchased after the February inventory had never been added. Auditors confirmed the replaced items were properly disposed of.
Auditors conducted a physical inventory in October 2010 and accounted for 21 rifles. None of the 21 serial numbers were correctly recorded on the facility’s master inventory. The facility had reassigned and reused internal facility numbers over time without updating serial numbers on the master list.
The master weapons inventory record posted inside the arsenal was dated June 2010 and omitted 16 shotguns that were physically present. A version on the facility network had been updated in September 2010. Auditors also found a handgun stored with a round in the chamber, and that shotguns were issued 34 times out of 66 without the required weapon and restraint authorization record.
A separate finding reported that weapons permits were not rescinded for two officers convicted of domestic violence, and that one of the two was subsequently assigned to clean weapons in the arsenal.
Of 165 weapon authorization records reviewed, 16 were incomplete. Eight of those did not document that the weapon had been returned to the arsenal. Auditors stated they did not identify any weapons missing. A separate material condition in the same report found that 58 dangerous tools, 36 equipment items, and 6 other controlled inventory items could not be located or accounted for after a tool storage area was disbanded.
A physical inventory in March 2013 found one rifle that did not appear on the master weapons inventory at all, and serial number mismatches on 8 of the other 14 rifles. The business office had not performed the required annual arsenal audits, which it attributed to an oversight. After auditors raised the discrepancy, the facility reviewed acquisition and disposal documentation back to 2009, accounted for the weapons, and updated the record.
The Control the Auditors Named Twice
Buried inside the St. Louis report is the finding that matters most, and it is not a count.
Auditors reported that the master weapons inventory record was maintained and updated by the arsenal sergeant, and that the arsenal sergeant was also the person responsible for issuing and receiving arsenal equipment. They stated that the record should be maintained and periodically verified by someone other than that person. They further noted that the file itself sat on a shared network location accessible to multiple individuals, and recommended restricting it.
That is a segregation-of-duties finding. It is one of the oldest concepts in internal control, and it exists because a single person who both handles an asset and keeps its record can make the record agree with whatever the asset does.
Two years later, at Macomb, auditors wrote effectively the same thing. The arsenal sergeant issued and received arsenal equipment, maintained and updated the master weapons inventory, and was responsible for the operation of the arsenal. To ensure proper control, an independent third party should maintain and periodically verify that record. The facility responded that it would assign the inspector to that role.
The recommendation was made facility by facility, and it was accepted facility by facility. There is no evidence in the audit record that it was ever converted into a statewide policy directive binding on every arsenal in the system. Each prison fixed its own copy of the problem, on its own timeline, with no mechanism to hold the fix in place after the auditors left.
Bellamy Creek: The Audit That Looked and Reported Nothing
Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia opened in 2001. The Auditor General has examined it twice. Once in April 2005. Once in October 2015.
The 2015 report is a short document. Four findings, all reportable conditions rather than material ones, and an overall conclusion that the facility generally complied with selected safety and security policies. Read the scope section, however, and the arsenal is right there. Arsenal inventories and operations were within the audit objective. So were firearm certifications and weapons permits. The auditors looked. They reported nothing.
What they did report deserves to be read next to that silence.
Of 95 gate manifests reviewed, 56 were not fully completed, a rate of 59 percent. Gate officers did not properly distribute 29 of the 95. In 30 instances the gate officer’s report was left blank, meaning the record did not show what happened to the items. The audit describes gate manifests as the mechanism used to control the introduction of contraband and the theft of state property.
Across three observed shift changes, 8 of 151 staff members entered the secure perimeter without passing through a metal detector or being screened with a handheld device. In two sampled months, 31 of 797 required monthly employee searches were not performed.
Set those two things beside each other. The record system that tracks property leaving the prison failed on the majority of the sampled documents. The screening that would catch a person carrying something out failed at a measurable rate. And the arsenal, which was inside the scope of the same audit, generated no finding at all.
There are two readings. Either the arsenal at Bellamy Creek was in genuinely good order in 2015, or the audit testing performed on it was not sensitive enough to surface a problem. The published report does not contain enough detail about arsenal testing at that facility to distinguish between them. That ambiguity is itself a finding about how these audits are constructed.
The Lab holds the free tools Clutch Justice uses to build investigations like this one, including records request generators, agency decision trees, and databases you can search yourself. If you want to run this method on your own state, start there.
Open The Lab ?The Nine-Year Gap
After the Oaks Correctional Facility report in December 2015, the Auditor General published no facility-level safety and security performance audit of any Michigan prison until March 2025.
Corrections work continued during that interval. The office issued audits of prisoner pharmaceuticals, security classification, food services, vocational programs, and the Women’s Huron Valley medical services. Those are real audits addressing real problems. None of them examined an arsenal.
The practical effect is that for more than nine years, no independent examiner walked into a Michigan prison weapons room, counted what was in it, and compared the serial numbers to the list. The system relied on its own self-audits during that period, and self-audits are performed by the facility on the facility.
An oversight function that operates once a decade is not an oversight function. It is a periodic photograph of a moving object, and the object knows when the shutter opens.
March 2025: Three Audits, Two Arsenals, One County
On March 27, 2025, the Auditor General released three facility audits simultaneously. Baraga in the Upper Peninsula, and two in Ionia County: the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility and the Ionia Correctional Facility. All three concluded that the facility partially complied, a weaker conclusion than any of the earlier reports reviewed here.
Auditors sampled 20 weeks of required inspections of sealed arsenal cabinets and found 6 were not performed. The cabinets in question held firearms, grenades, foggers, gas masks, and shotgun vests. Across 59 sampled shifts, daily arsenal inspections were improperly documented on 29. Eight checklists were nearly blank. Sixteen were missing check marks for individual items including a shotgun, handguns, a hand camera, and specified keys. Fifteen were unsigned.
The facility attributed this to having a newer arsenal sergeant after the previous one went on unexpected long-term leave, to the arsenal sergeant position not being staffed daily, and to the sergeant being assigned to work shifts in areas other than the arsenal.
Auditors also performed a physical inventory of every rifle, shotgun, and handgun at the facility on August 24, 2023 and verified that all were properly accounted for. Sampled officers held the firearm certifications required for their assignments. Separately, auditors concluded that corrections officers likely falsified cell search logbooks about 4 percent of the time, and that a third of observed cell searches took under a minute.
Weekly inspections of sealed arsenal cabinets were not performed 68 percent of the time on average. Daily arsenal inspections were not performed 18 percent of the time. Front gate surveillance review showed that 27 percent of items entering the facility and 12 percent of officers exiting the arsenal were not fully searched. Sallyport review showed 64 percent of sampled items, 55 percent of vehicles, and 24 percent of individuals were not fully searched.
No arsenal finding. Auditors did identify 30 former employees and contractors who still had access to key storage cabinets in the facility lobby. Those individuals had left facility employment an average of nearly two and a half years earlier, and each retained access to an average of 13 keys. Facility-owned vehicles passed through the sallyport without a gate manifest in 28 percent of observed instances, including a box truck carrying unidentified items.
The Ionia finding about officers leaving the arsenal without a full search is the one to sit with. It is not an inventory problem. It is the physical checkpoint between the weapons room and the parking lot, and video review showed it was not consistently operating.
These three reports were released eleven months before February 2026.
The Department Agreed. It Also Argued the Standard Did Not Exist.
The Handlon report is the first document in this fifteen-year record where the Department’s response to an arsenal finding is printed at length, and it is worth reading closely, because it explains how a finding can be accepted and survive at the same time.
The response opens with the standard formula. The Department agrees and will comply. It then explains the missed inspections: a newer arsenal sergeant following an unexpected long-term leave, a position not staffed every day, and a sergeant assigned to work elsewhere in the facility. It adds that the arsenal was sealed when not in use and the seals were documented, and states that no security breach resulted.
Then the response turns and contests the criterion. The Department notes that its policy directive on custody, security, and safety systems does not require any particular arsenal checklist for daily inspections, only that inspections and inventories be documented. It states that the daily inventory checklist the facility used is not an official form, is not held in the Department’s Document Access System, and functions as a guide for staff unfamiliar with auditing the arsenal. While acknowledging the checklists were incomplete and often unsigned, the Department writes that the dated checklist itself suggests the daily inspections were performed as required per policy.
Read it forward and the position resolves into something worse than the finding. If the checklist auditors examined was not an official record, then the daily arsenal inspection at that facility was not documented on any official record at all. The Department’s own directive requires that inspections and inventories be documented. An unofficial guide with missing check marks and no signature does not satisfy that requirement under either reading.
A dated form is evidence that a form was dated. It is not evidence that a shotgun was seen.
The remedies the Department listed are the same species as the ones listed in 2011 and 2013. Additional training for arsenal staff. A full-time arsenal sergeant at that facility. The assistant deputy warden auditing daily, weekly, and monthly inspections and reporting outcomes on a monthly report. All of it local. None of it a statewide policy directive, and none of it durable past the personnel who implement it.
Where the inspection records were actually kept
Two other findings in the same report describe the same disease in different tissue.
Auditors found the facility had not performed 15 percent of sampled daily tool inspections and 23 percent of sampled monthly tool inspections. The Department’s explanation was not that the inspections were skipped. It was that the documentation could not be produced, because the reports had been kept on the personal hard drives of a school principal, a school secretary, and an inspector, all of whom retired during the audit period. The material was unrecoverable. The remedy adopted was to move the reports onto a shared drive.
Front gate and sallyport review produced six instances out of 108 where items, vehicles, or individuals were not fully searched. Among them, a vending machine operator exited the front gate with a cart nobody inspected, a facility vehicle exited the sallyport with the trailer searched and the cab not, and an employee entered with an uninspected property cart. Fifteen of 77 observed vehicle movements through the sallyport were never entered in the logbook.
An institution whose tool inspection records lived on the private hard drives of employees who then retired is being asked, in 2026, to state how many weapons and how much munition left its arsenals. The audit record does not suggest it can, and it explains in some detail why.
The metal detectors were set to hospital mode
The same audit contains an observation that has nothing to do with the arsenal record and everything to do with whether anything could leave the building.
Auditors collected three metal objects from the facility’s own Vocational Village welding classroom: a welding rod, a flat piece of stainless steel, and a piece of welded scrap metal roughly five to seven inches long. They carried each object through all four walk-through metal detectors using four different concealment methods, including held openly in an open hand.
Of 48 attempted passes, the detectors registered a single detection. All four machines were set to a less restrictive sensitivity mode the manufacturer recommends for hospitals and courthouses rather than the correctional facility mode designed to detect all metal. After staff switched one machine to the correctional setting, all three objects were detected in every carrying method.
Auditors noted that Department policy is silent on sensitivity settings and silent on selecting an appropriate calibration test piece. The piece the facility used for monthly calibration is designed to simulate a small firearm.
This was not a hardware failure. The machines worked. They were configured to a standard written for buildings where the concern is a weapon rather than a shank, and no statewide policy told anyone otherwise.
Note where the Auditor General directed that observation. Not at the facility. At the Department, as a recommendation that statewide policy be evaluated. That is the correct altitude for a problem that is caused by an absent standard rather than an absent employee.
The arsenal recordkeeping recommendations were never written at that altitude. For fifteen years they were addressed to whichever prison happened to be audited that year, accepted by that prison, and left there.
Auditors determine that the rifles and gas guns in the arsenal are not the ones listed on the business office record. Weapons purchased more than a year earlier had never been entered. The annual reconciliation had been performed without checking serial numbers.
An annual audit that does not compare serial numbers cannot detect substitution or loss. The control existed on paper and did nothing.
Auditors physically account for 21 rifles. Not one of the serial numbers is correctly recorded on the master inventory. The facility had been reusing its own internal numbering without updating serials.
Serial numbers are how a weapon is traced once it leaves the building. A record with no accurate serials cannot support a theft report or a recovery.
Sixteen shotguns present in the arsenal do not appear on the master record posted there. Auditors report that the arsenal sergeant both handles the weapons and controls the record, and recommend an independent custodian. Weapons permits had not been rescinded after two domestic violence convictions.
This is the moment the state is told, in writing, that the person with the most access has the least oversight. The recommendation is accepted at one facility and applied at one facility.
One rifle is missing from the master inventory entirely and eight of fourteen serials do not match. The business office had not conducted the required annual arsenal audits. Auditors repeat the recommendation that an independent party maintain and verify the record.
A repeated finding across different facilities is a system finding. It was still being handled as a facility finding.
The arsenal is inside the audit scope and produces no finding. The audit does report that 56 of 95 gate manifests were not fully completed, and that staff entered the secure perimeter without screening during observed shift changes.
The published report does not describe what arsenal testing was performed, so a reader cannot tell whether the absence of a finding reflects a sound arsenal or limited testing.
The Auditor General publishes corrections audits during this period on pharmaceuticals, classification, food service, vocational programming, and medical services at Women’s Huron Valley. No facility-level safety and security audit is released for more than nine years.
Independent verification of prison weapons inventories effectively stops. Facilities continue performing self-audits, which are conducted by the facility on itself.
Handlon reports weekly arsenal inspections missed 30 percent of the time and daily inspections improperly documented nearly half the time, though a physical count of every firearm came back clean. Auditors also carry three metal objects through all four walk-through detectors undetected and find every machine set to a hospital and courthouse sensitivity mode. Ionia Correctional reports weekly sealed cabinet inspections missed 68 percent of the time on average, and video showing 12 percent of officers exiting the arsenal were not fully searched.
Both facilities sit in the same county as Bellamy Creek. Neither audit examined Bellamy Creek, which had not been audited since 2015. The Department agreed with every recommendation while contesting whether the arsenal checklist standard existed.
The Ionia County Sheriff’s Office, assisted by the Michigan State Police bomb squad, searches the home of a Bellamy Creek arsenal sergeant and removes 196 firearms along with items identified in reporting as Department property. The Department places the employee on an unpaid stop order and opens an internal investigation. He resigns. All matters remain allegations.
No public statement has established how many of the recovered items originated in a state arsenal, or whether existing inventory records would permit that determination.
A federal grand jury in the Western District of Michigan returns an indictment on firearms counts, unsealed May 21. The same day, the Ionia County Prosecutor moves to dismiss the 25 pending state charges, including the embezzlement count, telling the Detroit Free Press that dismissal clears the way for the federal case.
The federal counts address possession and registration of specific firearms. No count in the federal indictment adjudicates the ownership or removal of state property.
What the Bellamy Creek Case Does and Does Not Establish
Precision matters here more than emphasis, so it is worth being exact about what the public record supports.
Reporting establishes that 196 firearms were removed from a residence in Ionia County on February 20, 2026, and that investigators also recovered items described as Department of Corrections property, including munitions and tactical equipment. A detective testified that the Bellamy Creek warden confirmed the employee had no authorization to remove the recovered equipment. The employee held the position of arsenal sergeant. He resigned. The Department opened an internal investigation.
What the public record does not establish is a number. Not one authority has stated how many of the 196 firearms were state property. Not the Department, not the sheriff’s office, not the county prosecutor, not the United States Attorney. The federal indictment identifies specific weapons by type for charging purposes. It does not allocate the collection between private acquisition and institutional origin.
The absence of that number is not a gap in reporting. It is the substantive result. Fifteen years of audit findings describe exactly why a state in this position would struggle to produce it, and no agency has said publicly whether Michigan can produce it now.
That is the question worth pressing, and it is answerable. Either a full statewide reconciliation of arsenal inventories against physical stock has been conducted since February 2026, or it has not. Either the resulting variance is zero, or it is a number. A department confident in its controls answers that in one sentence.
What a Pre-Trial Dismissal and a Federal Firearms Prosecution Actually Foreclose
The state case included an embezzlement count. That count went away on May 21, 2026, when the county prosecutor moved to dismiss the 25 state charges. Nothing in the federal indictment replaces it. The federal theory is built on the National Firearms Act and machinegun possession, which turn on the characteristics of specific weapons and their registration status, not on where those weapons were obtained.
The practical result is that the allegation involving state property is currently pending in front of no court.
Whether it could be revived is a separate question from whether anyone intends to revive it, and the legal architecture is not ambiguous.
A nolle prosequi is a dismissal without prejudice
Under MCL 767.29, a Michigan prosecutor may not enter a nolle prosequi or otherwise abandon a charge without stating the reasons on the record and obtaining leave of the court. The State Court Administrative Office form used to enter that order, form MC 263, provides on its face that the granted motion dismisses the case or the specified charges without prejudice. The statute exists to protect defendants from repeated dismissal and refiling, and Michigan courts have described that purpose directly. It does not operate as a bar.
Jeopardy never attached
In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. In a bench trial, it attaches when the first witness is sworn. A dismissal entered at the district court stage precedes both events. Double jeopardy therefore does not prevent the state from bringing the charge again.
The federal prosecution does not consume the state’s interest
Under the separate sovereigns doctrine, an act that violates both federal and state law constitutes an offense against each sovereign, and prosecution by one does not bar prosecution by the other. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that doctrine in Gamble v. United States in 2019. A federal conviction on firearms counts would not resolve, and would not preclude, a state charge concerning state property.
The clock has not run
Michigan’s catchall limitation period under MCL 767.24 is six years for offenses not otherwise specified. The conduct alleged is dated to February 2026.
A county prosecutor deciding that federal charges carry more sentencing exposure is a legitimate exercise of discretion. That decision resolves how one defendant will be punished. It does not resolve whether the State of Michigan lost property, how much, or from where. Those are separate questions, and dismissing the state case removed the only proceeding in which they were being asked.
Michigan’s Attorney General has independent statutory authority under MCL 14.28 to intervene in and appear for the people in any court, in any cause, civil or criminal, when in the Attorney General’s judgment the interests of the state require it. Whether that authority should be exercised here is a policy judgment. Whether it exists is not.
Michigan’s audit function performed. Michigan’s correction function did not, and the state currently has no proceeding, no published inventory reconciliation, and no public figure describing what left its arsenals.
Who This Actually Falls On
The people with the least ability to protect themselves from a weapons control failure are the people who cannot leave the building.
Corrections officers work armed posts inside facilities where, according to the state’s own auditors, weapons permits were not always rescinded after disqualifying convictions, weapons were issued without authorization records, and inventory documents did not describe the weapons in the room. Incarcerated people live inside those perimeters with no say in any of it and no ability to verify anything. Families visiting on weekends pass through the same gates the audits describe as inconsistently staffed and inconsistently searched.
None of those groups has standing to demand an inventory. The Legislature does. The Auditor General does. The Attorney General does. The Department does.
What Fixing This Would Actually Require
Not more audits. Michigan has been audited. The audits were correct. The failure is downstream of detection, which means the remedy has to attach to correction rather than discovery.
Convert the 2011 and 2013 recommendations into a statewide policy directive. The master weapons inventory for every facility should be maintained by a designated custodian outside the custody chain, with write access restricted and logged, and the arsenal sergeant given read-only access. This is the single highest-value change available and it costs nothing.
A one-time reconciliation of every facility arsenal against physical stock, by serial number, with the aggregate variance published. Not the location of weapons, which is properly withheld. The variance count, which is a public accountability figure and reveals nothing operationally sensitive.
A nine-year interval between independent facility examinations is a policy choice, not a constraint. The Legislature can require independent serial-number verification of every facility arsenal on a defined cycle and require the results be reported to the appropriations subcommittees.
Under MCL 18.1462, an audited agency submits a plan to comply within 60 days. There is no published mechanism confirming that the plan was implemented or that the condition stopped recurring at other facilities. A short annual status report on prior-year corrections audit recommendations would surface a repeat finding before it becomes a fifteen-year pattern.
State publicly whether the Department can determine how many weapons and how much munition left its custody without authorization, and if so, what the number is. If it cannot, say that instead. Both answers are useful. Silence is the only response that is not.
The audits are not the scandal. The audits are the state doing its job, in public, repeatedly, in plain language, for fifteen years. Michigan wrote down what was wrong with its prison arsenals, agreed with itself about how to fix it, and then produced a situation in which nobody can say what is gone.
That is what an accountability failure looks like when it is working correctly. Nothing is hidden. Everything is filed. And the number still does not exist.
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