A recent proposal from the Michigan Judicial Council and the Trial Court Funding Commission may offer a much needed overhaul to how Michigan’s trial courts are funded. This is more than just a big deal; it represents a potentially historic shift for the state’s justice system.
Under the current model, local governments carry the bulk of court-funding burdens; in some cases more than 50 %) and courts often rely on fees and fines to keep their operations going. The new model proposes that courts’‐generated revenue be sent into a centralized fund managed by the state’s treasury and that the state increase its contribution so that local units are held to a “maintenance of effort” (MOE) standard of contribution.
This is a big deal, not just for how courts operate, but also for how power and money flow through the criminal justice system. It also opens up a less-discussed dimension: political resistance. Why, for example, are many Republican lawmakers raising concerns? Beyond ideological arguments about local control or state spending, there’s reason to believe some of the pushback reflects underlying financial and institutional dynamics, especially in rural jurisdictions where the justice infrastructure (including policing, courts, detention, and fees) carries significant weight.
What’s Changing: The Mechanics
Here’s a quick rundown of key features of the proposed model:
- Under the plan, local units of government will continue contributing funds, but only up to what they have historically contributed (“MOE”). The state would then pick up the remainder to meet operational costs.
- All court-generated revenue (fees, assessments) would go into a new statewide “Trial Court Fund” housed in the Michigan Department of Treasury. That fund would then distribute monies to local courts based on defined cost metrics rather than case-by-case revenue needs.
- Courts would adopt statewide formulas or standard processes for assessing fees/assessments and determining indigency, even though judges retain discretion for fines and restitution.
- In return, collection functions may actually be shifted away from local courts toward state mechanisms (in some versions) to reduce burdens on courts and to eliminate revenue-generation incentives tied directly to sentencing or assessments.
In short: the reform aims to reduce the conflict of interest that arises when courts must rely on fees and fines for revenue, and to create a more stable, predictable funding base that treats justice as a public good rather than a revenue stream.
Why It Matters for Justice
From a justice-reform perspective, the implications, if everything is done correctly, could be quite powerful:
- If courts aren’t financially tied to the number or type of fees they impose, then there’s less pressure (real or perceived) for revenue-motivated sentencing or assessments.
- A state-led funding stream may yield more equitable access to services across counties, especially for smaller or under-resourced jurisdictions where fee revenues are low or unpredictable.
- For individuals interacting with the justice system, standardization of fees and better indigency assessments could significantly reduce burdens on low-income people.
- Courts could then hopefully focus more on process, fairness and outcomes rather than balancing their budget via fines and fees.
From an operational standpoint, local governments might gain more predictability (if the state picks up a larger share) and courts might be freed from revenue-collection burdens that distract from core judicial functions.
This is also a welcome departure from the current model, where you see rural counties like Allegan or Barry prosecute every single case whether it has merit or not for the sake of revenue. Barry also touts some of the highest fees in the Southwest Michigan area.
The Political and Institutional Stakes
One of the most interesting dimensions is the political pushback, particularly from Republican lawmakers and certain local government associations. For example:
- Representative Jay DeBoyer (R-Clay Township) argued that “good actors who do not run a budget deficit should not be forced to subsidize irresponsible actors” in other counties under the proposed scheme.
- Republicans have also raised concerns about increasing legislative appropriation burdens, the shifting of local control to state authority, and whether the reform deals with root causes of local court operational deficits.
But beyond the surface arguments, there are deeper institutional and financial dynamics at play; dynamics that help explain why change is so hard, and why resistance can be significant even when reform looks reasonable on paper.
Revenue Streams & Local Incentives
Many local jurisdictions, nespecially those in traditionally Republican regions, have built parts of their revenue and institutional infrastructure around the existing court/fee/fine system. Imposing and collecting assessments (sometimes through mechanisms like bench warrants or license suspensions) generates revenue that flows into local government or court budgets. If a shift occurs to state funding, that revenue flow could shrink or be repurposed away from local discretion.
Institutional Networks & “Body Count” Economics
In regions with prisons, jails, or high incarceration rates (sometimes called “body count” economies), there is often a tangled web of financial dependencies: local law enforcement, courts, for-profit or publicly funded detention infrastructure, and associated ancillary services. When courts are funded in part through the enforcement of fees/fines, there’s an incentive to maintain or grow case loads, which drives revenue, staffing, and local institutional employment. A change in funding structure threatens those built-in incentives.
Put differently: if court funding becomes more dependent on state appropriation rather than local fee revenue or enforcement activity, jurisdictions that have leveraged those enforcement-based revenue models may feel directly threatened, not ideologically, but economically.
Political Alignment & Local Power
In many states, local political economies vary between urban and rural areas, and between Democratic and Republican strongholds. Rural or suburban counties (often Republican-leaning) may have built operational models around local revenue generation and local discretion over courts and law enforcement.
What does this mean? A shift toward centralization and state oversight may be perceived not just as a policy change but as a shift in local power dynamics, coloring the opposition.
Why This Reform Could Be a Test Case
For Michigan, this reform serves as a major litmus test on several fronts:
- Will the Legislature buy into shifting more of the cost burden to the state rather than counties?
- Can the system transition without destabilizing courts that rely heavily on fee/fine revenue now?
- How will local actors respond when the incentives shift—and how will that affect enforcement practices, sentencing, and court operations?
- Will this lead to more equitable outcomes across counties, or will resource disparities persist regardless of funding model?
If successful, Michigan may very well position itself as a national leader in court-funding reform. If not, the resistance and institutional inertia may serve as a cautionary tale of how deeply financial incentives are embedded in the justice system.
However, I don’t want to count reform chickens before they hatch, as there are so many opportunities that have been squandered.
What To Watch
So while we wait to see how it all shakes out, here’s what to watch:
- How the Michigan Legislature responds: whether they appropriate more state funds, and under what timeline.
- How local governments and court systems adapt: whether they restructure their operations, reduce reliance on fee/fine revenue, and how staff or enforcement patterns change.
- Monitoring whether enforcement of fees/fines declines (or becomes more equitable) over time.
- Whether counties with significant revenue from current models push back more strongly (or strike deals).
- Whether the reform triggers unintended consequences—like budget shortfalls for courts mid-transition, or local governments pivoting to other revenue streams.
All of this will be incredibly valuable data to help make evidence-based decisions rather than knee-jerk “tough on crime” rhetoric.
Pulling it All Together
This one isn’t just another budget tweak.
The proposed shift in Michigan’s trial-court funding model brings into focus the often-ignored financial architecture underpinning justice systems. It poses real questions about fairness, access, and institutional incentives. It also hints at why political resistance can be so strong, even when reformers have what seems like sensible proposals: the change threatens local revenue models, power structures, and institutional habits that run deep. And that kind of change always gets under people’s skin, especially when it affects their bottom line.
For those of us who care about justice, this is not just about courts; it’s about how money, power, and local government intersect. Watching how Michigan navigates this could provide lessons far beyond its borders.
