Key Takeaways
- Three strikes laws were intended to reduce crime but have fueled mass incarceration and widened racial disparities.
- Data shows these laws are ineffective at preventing violent crime and result in harsh penalties for low-level offenses.
- Reform efforts in California, such as Proposition 36, aim to limit life sentences to serious crimes and allow for resentencing.
- The impact of three strikes laws disproportionately affects minority groups, leading to calls for systemic changes.
- Comprehensive reform is necessary to prioritize rehabilitation over extended incarceration under current three strikes law reform.
In 2021, while completing master’s coursework in Criminal Justice at Purdue University Global, I examined the rise and impact of three strikes laws in the United States. At the time, the assignment was academic. Today, the stakes feel far less theoretical.
Three strikes laws were sold to the public as common-sense crime control. The promise was simple: remove the most dangerous offenders from society and violent crime would decline. Nearly three decades later, the data tells a different story. Instead of reducing violence, these laws have fueled mass incarceration, expanded racial disparities, and imposed life sentences for low-level offenses that bear little resemblance to the public fear that birthed them.
The analysis that follows remains grounded in research, but it is no longer just a classroom exercise. It is a reflection on how policy built on fear can calcify into systemic harm when not regularly reexamined.
What are Three Strikes Laws?
Implemented in twenty-four states in the 1990’s, three strikes laws intended to clean up the streets and prevent crime through implementing harsh penalties for the worst, most violent crimes, such as rape and murder1. Unfortunately, the road to hell is often paved with good intentions. Rather than deterring violent offenders from committing crimes and keeping people out of the criminal justice system, arcane three strikes laws create the opposite effect. Every year, strike laws actively contribute to overpopulation in United States’ prisons2. Data readily confirms 1990s era three strikes laws are ineffective, unfair to low level offenders and minority groups, and in dire need of reform.
How Did They Begin?
Part of a 1993 effort to get tough on crime, Washington state became the first in the U.S. mandating life imprisonment without possibility of parole for individuals convicted of their third violent offense3. In 1994, California voters ushered in the strictest iteration of three strikes laws in the United States4. The model proved popular; in that same year, additional states adopted mandatory sentencing increases for multiple offense incarceration5. California’s three strikes law is unique, applying strikes toward non-violent and violent offenses alike. This policy differs from laws of other states, requiring strikable offenses be serious or violent crimes6. Proponents of the law believed extending sentences for crimes would remove repeat offenders from society and prevent additional crimes from occurring. Under California three strikes law, a person with one previous violent or serious felony conviction will face higher penalties than a first-time offender; a second-strike doubles normal length sentence, and a third felony hands down a sentence of 25-years to life. These three strikes laws, in essence, double prison sentences without regard to a crime’s severity. Indiscrimination between serious and non-serious crimes, directly contributing to a mass incarceration problem.
Following the Data: Three Strike Laws are Ineffective
Since its implementation around 30 years ago, data consistently demonstrates three strikes laws as being ineffective. Although the goal of said laws aims to prevent violent crime against property and people, many studies instead find three strikes laws ineffective at reducing violent crimes such as rape, robbery, burglary, or assault. As California accounts for over 90 percent of three strikes sentencing, their data is worth examining to determine the efficacy of three strikes laws7. A 1999 study examining cases in California compared counties strictly enforcing the three strikes laws, and counties more lenient in their application; surprisingly, there was no noticeable decline in crime for strict enforcement counties when compared to counties that were more lenient in enforcing three strikes laws. In a larger two-decade long study, researchers examined cases in 188 cities in three strikes states with populations of 100,000 or more. The data demonstrates an increase in homicide cases and no sizable reduction in crime rates . Rather than preventing violent crime, some national studies suggest it creates a “nothing to lose” mentality. Offenders on the verge of receiving their third strike are more likely to change their modus operandi or kill witnesses to avoid capture and subsequent long-term incarceration. By March 2003, with a near decade of “tough on crime” policies on the books, strikes laws fail to achieve intended crime prevention goals. Instead, America found itself housing over two million incarcerated individuals8.
A Recipe for Mass Incarceration
Three strikes laws readily contribute to overpopulation in prisons. Upon implementation of three strikes laws and enhanced penalties, California began seeing an increase in prison population and operational costs9. Increased prison stays for non-violent or non-serious offenses accounted for 56% of strike prison population; serious and violent strike offenders comprise only 44%. This imbalance occurs as some strike laws are harsher on menial crimes such as property or drug offenses10. The Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project sees their share of life sentences handed down for menial crimes. In the past, this project represented individuals who received life sentences for things such as stealing loose change from a vehicle, possessing small amounts of drugs, and attempting to break into a soup kitchen11. As strike laws require decades long sentences of offenders, often eliminating the possibility of parole, it creates a “sleeper effect” in which offenders accumulate. For example, an offender sentenced to 25-years in 1996 would not be eligible for release until 2021; meanwhile, new offenders continue to come in. Not only are three strikes laws failing to achieve their intended goals and instead overpopulating prisons, the population disproportionately leans toward minority groups.
Bias in the System
People of color make up significant numbers of three strike prisoners. Data from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reveals three strikes laws to excessively favor minority groups. African Americans account for 6.6% of the California state population but when it comes to California prisons, African Americans comprise 33.5% of California’s second-strike prisoners, and 45.7% of third-strike prisoners (2012, as cited in Oleson, 2015). Sadly, another study found that African Americans are 13 times more likely to be imprisoned than whites under three strikes laws7. Hispanics make up 38.2% of California’s population, and constitute 35% of second and third-strike prisoners (2012, as cited in Oleson, 2015). These numbers become more problematic when examining the data for Non-Hispanic whites. Even though Non-Hispanic whites account for 39.4% of the prison population, only 24.1% of them are considered strikers (2012, as cited in Olseon, 2015). Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to California or even the United States. When New Zealand adopted its own three strikes laws, minority groups were disproportionately incarcerated there as well. Census data reveals that New Zealand is mostly composed of individuals of European descent with two other minority groups represented as strikers, as well. Three strikes laws have proved so problematic, that Californians recognized unfairness as well as need for reform.
How California is Addressing Three Strikes Law Reform
Efforts to reform California three strikes laws began in 2004 with Proposition 66. The verbiage proposed altering the laws, ensuring only defendants guilty of serious crimes could be sentenced as a third striker12. Ultimately, Proposition 66 did not pass due to the language, as offenders would be exempt from third strike punishment for low-level crimes no matter their original offense. In 2012, Proposition 36 made its way to the ballot, clarifying language and ensuring third strike offenders such as rapists, murderers, or child molesters would continue to receive life sentences for crimes whether or not their offense was non-serious. This action also afforded third strikers the opportunity to apply for resentencing, allowing judges to decide if a defendant’s crime was a credible risk to public safety13. When asked why they approved Proposition 36, 76% of voters cited fairness, conveying that life sentences are not fitting punishment for low-level crimes . After passage of Proposition 36, the Stanford Law Three Strikes Project partnered with re-entry providers to create a statewide network of resources for newly released non-violent offenders, providing them tools for a successful life outside of prison. Some of the services include housing, sobriety support, mental health treatment, peer support, and job-finding assistance14. This approach proves successful, as only 4% of those released under Proposition 36 returned to prison.
In Closing
In closing, data determines three strikes laws are unfair, disproportionately affective toward minorities, and require modification. For violent offenders, the fear of prison and harsh punishment is not enough to deter commission of crimes. It more likely becomes justification to not get caught. With taxpayers footing the bill for lengthy non-violent offenders’ incarcerations, reexamining three strikes laws is more important than ever. While California and other states are taking steps toward reform, there is more work to do. The criminal justice system must embrace rehabilitation and re-entry programs to change today’s landscape. Preventing crimes, rather than incarcerating people longer when they offend, must become a cornerstone of prison reform in order to address and better control recidivism.
References
1 Marvell, T. B., & Moody, C. E. (2001). The lethal effects of three-strikes laws. Journal of Legal Studies, 30(1), 89-106.
2 Oleson, J. C. (2015). Habitual criminal legislation in New Zealand: Three years of three-strikes. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 48(2), 277-292.
3 Kovandzic, T. V., Sloan, John J., I.,II, & Vieraitis, L. M. (2004). “Striking out” as crime reduction policy: The Impact of “Three Strikes” Laws on Crime Rates in U.S. Cities. Justice Quarterly: JQ, 21(2), 207-239. http://dx.doi.org.libauth.purdueglobal.edu/10.1080/07418820400095791
4 Chen, E. Y. (2014). In the furtherance of justice, injustice, or both a multilevel analysis of courtroom context and the implementation of three strikes. Justice Quarterly, 31(2), 257-286.
5 Kessler, D., & Levitt, S. D. (1999). Using sentence enhancements to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation. Journal of Law & Economics, 42(1 Part 2), 343-364.
6 Datta, A. (2017). California’s three strikes law revisited: assessing the long-term effects of the law. Atlantic Economic Journal, 45(2), 225–249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-017-9544-8
7 Vitiello, M. (2002, April 1). Three strikes laws: a real or imagined deterrent to crime? American Bar Association. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol29_2002/spring2002/hr_spring02_vitiello/.
8 Boyd, R. (2014). Narratives of sacrificial expulsion in the supreme court’s affirmation of California’s “three strikes and you’re out” Law. Legal Communication & Rhetoric: JALWD, 11, 83–108.
9 Brown, B., & Jolivette, G. (2005, October). A primer: Three strikes – The impact after more than a decade. https://lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm.
10 Travis, J., Western, B., & Redburn, S. (2014). The growth of incarceration in the United States: exploring causes and consequences. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/18613.
11 Three strikes basics. Stanford Law School. https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-advocacy-project/three-strikes-basics/.
12 Mills, D., & Romano, M. (2013). The passage and implementation of the three strikes reform act of 2012 (proposition 36). Federal Sentencing Reporter, 25(4), 265-270.
13 Karch, A., & Cravens, M. (2014). Rapid diffusion and policy reform: The adoption and modification of three strikes laws. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 14(4), 461-491. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libauth.purdueglobal.edu/10.1177/1532440014561867
14 Driscoll, S. & Romano, M. (2014, December 15). Three strikes: An update after propositions reform sentencing for nonviolent offenders and milestone of 2000th prisoner released approaches. Stanford Law School. https://law.stanford.edu/2014/12/15/three-strikes-an-update-after-propositions-reform-sentencing-for-nonviolent-offenders/
Krikorian, G. (1996, March 5). More Blacks imprisoned under ‘3 strikes,’ study says. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-03-05-mn-43270-story.html.
